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Abstract 
Perpetual peace, an old yet significant idea in the history of Western Philosophy, 
is no doubt crucial to the development of mankind. Kant is plainly the first 
philosopher who introduces some philosophical elements into the theory of 
perpetual peace. The notion of perpetual peace can be deemed as the final purpose 
of his Metaphysics of Morals. Unfortunately, Kant's theory of perpetual peace has 
been underestimated by academic circles for almost two centuries. In recent years, 
however, many scholars have repositioned their focal point to this theory chiefly 
promoted by crises in international affairs which arise from the hostility between 
states. Thus, it is instructive to re-study his theory of perpetual peace. 
This study thus a吐empts to investigate the ground of the theory of perpetual 
peace and to appraise some substantial claims in Kant's famous essay, i.e. Towards 
Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project. This study is divided into three chapters. 
The first examines the ground of perpetual peace, i.e. the notions of freedom and of 
public right. The second a吐empts to spell out the function of the notion of 
purposiveness as a dependable guarantee of perpetual peace. The third appraises 
some substantial claims in the project focusing on the six preliminary articles and the 
three definitive articles. Although Kant clearly notes the notion of perpetual peace as 
an unachievable idea, it can be regarded as "con討 nual approxima討on" which 
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Introduction 
The year of 1789, in which the French Revolution began, was no doubt a 
significant year in Western history. The Revolution, with its slogan "Men are born 
free and live free and with equal rights," abolished all feudal privileges and 
implemented the republic in France. Kant, like many intellectuals in German-speaking 
countries such as Herder, Schiller and Fichte, watched the Revolution and was deeply 
inspired by it. As one of his friends said, "he lived and moved in it ... and, in spite of 
all the terror, he held on to his hopes so much that when he heard of the declaration 
of the republic he called out with excitement: 'Now let your servant go in peace to 
his grave, for I have seen the glory of the world."'1 Kant's subsequent writings show 
that in spirit he was unequivocally an adherent of the Revolution. In 1795 Kant 
published his well-known work, Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project 
(Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf}, in which he attempted to design 
a project for human beings in their endeavor to achieve perpetual peace. lt has been 
well recognized that this work is of great significance for Kant's moral and political 
philosophy. After spelling out his basic tenets of transcendental philosophy in the 
three Critiques, he began to apply them in different philosophical areas, to rethink 
and solve those more pragmatic problems surfacing in the history of humankind. As 
such, Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project can be deemed as a fruitful 
continuance of the Kantian enterprise of transcendental philosophy. 
As is well known, in his moral and political philosophy, Kant not only attempted 
1 Rudolf Malter, Kant in Rede und Gespri:ich, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. 348. I quote the 
sentence from Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 
341-342. 
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to solve the problems of good and evil and the relation between reason and will, but 
was also concerned with the problem of right, especially the right of citizen and 
states. From his chronology of publication, one can clearly see that the theory of 
perpetual peace is one of the core themes in his later works. Besides Toward 
Perpetual Peace -A Philosophy Project, there are two other important works dealing 
with the very topic, i.e. "On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it 
is of no use in practice,"(Ober den Gemeinspruch: Dos mag in der Theorie richtig sein, 
taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis)(1792) and The Metaphysics of Morals (Metaphysik der 
Sitten) (1797). When one scrutinizes these two works, it would seem clear that the 
former is a preparation for the theory of perpetual peace, whereas the latter offers a 
systematic discussion of the grounds of this theory. Accordingly, these three could be 
regarded as Kant's representative works on his theory of perpetual peace. 
There may be some who deem this theory as being too old and useless on the 
grounds that it cannot deal with those troublesome modern international affairs. I 
nevertheless believe that it is illuminating to re-read Kant's theory of perpetual 
peace since it provides many inspiring insights To be sure, the notion of perpetual 
peace was indeed an aged idea in European history, which can be traced back to the 
late sixteenth-century 2 and was debated of in the era of Enlightenment. 
Nevertheless, it is Kant who firstly articulated a philosophical foundation into the 
notion, and made it an epochal and indispensable standpoint for modern 
international affairs. As a Pauline Kleingeld points out, owing to "the recent 
resurgence of debates about globalization, about the role and mandate of the United 
Nations, and about the international order after the end of the Cold War, Kant's 
2 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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theory of peace has been steadily gaining attention since 1989 ."3 
In concluding the Doctrine of Right in The Metaphysics of Moral, Kant explicitly 
indicates that "establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a part 
of the doctrine of right but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of right within 
the limits of mere reason."4 Taking perpetual peace as the final pursuit of the 
metaphysics of moral, he devises a project to fulfill it. The Kantian idea of perpetual 
peace has influenced many contemporary philosophers, including John Rawls and 
Jurgen Habermas. The former has written a distinguished work, The Law of Peoples, 5 
which provides a new perspective to deal with world peace. And the latter has 
tackled the problem in regard to the unification of Europe. Perpetual peace, as Rawls 
says, is a "realistic utopia" rather than an impracticable project. 6 The League of 
Nations (1949-45) and the United Nations (1945-) maybe well seen as examples of 
preliminary achievements of the project of perpetual peace in human political life. 
But what are the conditions under which perpetual peace can be attained? How 
should international order be constructed in virtue of peaceful principles? Are there 
any problems with the project, in theoretical or practical dimensions? I believe that 
by studying Kant's theory of perpetual peace we may gain useful insights in resolving 
international entanglements. 
I. Literature review 
For a very long time, students of Kant had devoted most of their enthusiasm to 
3 Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's theory of peace", in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern 
philosoph~ ed. Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 477. 
4 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 355. 
5 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1999). 
6 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, op. cit., p. 5. 
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his works of the Critical period, and it is in very recent years that his political 
philosophy and, specifically, his idea of perpetual peace, have been revitalizing by 
scholars. Here are some examples of new researches on Kantian political theories. 
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays7 concentrated on human rights 
and virtue ethics; Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy8 and 
Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy9 discussed external freedom and jurisdiction; 
Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy introduced the third Critique 
into the explanation of Kant's political philosophy. 10 
For the purpose of the present study, it is worthwhile to note a significant event. 
In 1995 a conference was held in Frankfurt to commemorate the bicentenary of the 
publication of Toward Perpetual Peace -A Philosophical Project. Papers of the 
conference have been collated into a volume called Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's 
Cosmopolitan ldeal. 11 This volume, as the name of the book suggests, was devoted 
exclusively to discussions of Kant's theory of perpetual peace, its influence on 
international law and the realization of men as world citizens. 
Other scholars have also been discussing Kant's notion of peace from different 
perspectives. For instance, Otfried Hoffe's Kant's Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and 
Peace, 12 investigated many important aspects of Kant's theory of moral, such as 
7 Mark Timmons ed .1 Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays (New York: Oxford 
University Press~ 2002). 
8 Ronald Beiner and William James Booth eds. 1 Kant and political philosophy: the contemporary 
legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press~ 1993). 
9 Howard Williams ed .1 Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press~ 
1992). 
10 Hannah Arendtl Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy~ ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press~ 1982). 
11 James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds. 1 Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan 
Ideal (Cambridge~ Mass.: MIT Press~ 1997). 
12 Otfried Hoffel Kant's Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace~ trans. Alexandra Newton~ (New York: 
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natural law, good and evil, faculty of judgment etc., and meanwhile evaluated how 
these aspects can contribute to the cosmopolitan theory of law and peace. 
In her work Kant~s Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World, 13 
Elisabeth Ellis introduced a different perspective for The Metaphysics of Moral, 
namely, a provisional right which "always leaves open the possibility of leaving the 
state of nature among states ... and entering a rightful condition." 14 She expanded this 
point of view from private right to public right, especially in terms of international 
relationship. 
From the works mentioned above, one could conclude briefly that there are 
some valuable reflections on Kant's theory of perpetual peace: 
1. Most scholars seem to be aware of the relevance of Kant's moral philosophy in the 
political sphere and, based on their interpretations, attempts are made to apply the 
former to the latter. Moral and political philosophies are no doubt interrelated. lt 
seems, however, that there are few discussions on Kant's political philosophy from 
the inter-personal perspective. We may thus see a different picture if we construe 
Kant's theory of peace in terms of inter-subjectivity. 
2. While indeed more and more scholars have paid attention to the significance of 
Kant's theory of perpetual peace, their efforts were put largely on the explanation of 
the notion of peace itself. The relationship between this notion and Kant's critical 
philosophy, especially that expounded in Critique of the Power of Judgment~ have still 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
13 Elisabeth El lis, Kant/s Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005). 
14 Ell is, Kanes Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World, op. cit. p. 3; 112. The Metaphysics of 
Morals, 6: 256; 347. 
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been much neglected. A careful reading of Toward Perpetual Peace, however, revel 
that Kant himself had been well aware of the relationship. Kant explicitly introduces 
the notion of purposiveness, originally articulated in the third Critique, into the 
theory of perpetual peace, as an important principle regulating our mind in 
conceiving perpetual peace. This neglected relationship leaves a wide gap to be filled 
before Kant's theory of peace can be properly elucidated in contemporary contexts. 
11. The studying content 
Starting with Kant's transcendental philosophical perspective, the main theme 
of this study is to investigate his theory of peace. This study is divided into three 
chapters with the following sub-topics: 
Chapter 1. From Subjectivity of Individuals to Inter-Subjectivity: Moral Law and Social 
Contract in Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace 
lt is a long tradition in Western philosophy to view the ground of human right as 
natural law, which is construed as a principle determining nature and human action 
alike.15 Nevertheless, Kant deliberately transposes the ground of right from natural 
law to moral law, to the extent that moral law becomes the only ground of the right. 
Furthermore, Kant, inspired by Hobbes, argues that the notion of Original Contract 
can construct the public right which includes the right of states. Starting from this 
preliminary foundation, in this chapter, I shall attempt to explain that Kant's 
argument of public right involves the Wille--Willkur distinction and the notion of 
Original Contract. 
15 P. H. Re ill and E. J. Wilson eds., Encyclopedia of Enlightenment (New York: Facts On File, 1996), 
pp.299-300. 
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Chapter 2. Nature's guarantee of perpetual peace and the notion of purposiveness 
In the project of perpetual peace, Kant appeals to providence as the guarantee 
of perpetual peace. Some scholars nevertheless object to this argument and argue 
that providence is redundant in the theory of perpetual peace. This objection, 
admittedly, neglects Kant's notion of nature, reflective judgment and purposiveness. 
In this chapter, I shall try to defend the Kantian idea that purposiveness is a 
necessary notion for the theory of perpetual peace. 
Chapter 3. Appraising the project of perpetual peace 
In his project of perpetual peace, Kant brings forward some substantial claims, 
i.e. the six preliminary articles and the three definitive articles, the latter of which 
can be deemed as the core of the project. This chapter will attempt to explain these 
articles in detail, especially the three definitive articles. Included in this chapter wil l 
be a discussion of the relation between establishing international organizations and 
the scope of common affairs, as well as the relation between cosmopolitan right and 
the spirit of commerce. 
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1. From subjectivity of individuals to inter-subjectivity: Moral 
Law and Social Contract in the Theory of Perpetual Peace 
In Kant's theory of perpetual peace, the notion of right including both right of 
states and cosmopolitan right is of great theoretic significance. According to what 
Kant had famously articulated in his critique of practical reason, every human being 
with his own freedom should be compatible with each other. Applying this maxim 
into the context of international relation, one easily come to the idea that every state 
being with its own freedom should be compatible with each other, and not infringe 
upon right of other states. Right is not a privilege of some people or of some states, 
but belongs to you and me. As Kant argues, right is "mine and yours" (dos Mein und 
Dein), from which Kant plainly denotes the possession of right for all human beings. 
From the view of right as "mine and yours," Kant further discusses the problem of 
right. 
What is the ground of right? This had been a perplexing issue in the history of 
philosophy. Many philosophers, in particular philosophers in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, e.g. Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke, appeal to the notion of 
natural law (Naturrecht) 16 and social contract in tackling the problem. Natural law is 
considered by them as an ultimate metaphysical principle for constructing an order 
of the world and for binding human actions as well. In comparison to the notion of 
theocracy, the notion of social contract is a new perspective for constructing the right 
in the public sphere. Inspired by some of these philosophers, in his theory of 
16 The notion of "natural law" is confused with the scientific notion of "law of nature" (Gesetze der 
Natur). I shall discuss them in the following. 
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perpetual peace Kant attempts to articulate the right of state through the notion of 
social contract.17 As Rawls squarely remarks, Kant's stance can be regarded as being 
in the tradition of social contract theory.18 As for natural law, his attitude is different 
from that of his precedents in that he appeals to moral law rather than natural law in 
articulating the notion of right. 19 If one scrutinizes Critique of Pure Reason, Critique 
of Practical Reason and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral, one easily notices 
that, in handling the ground of right, Kant tacitly shifts the focus from natural law to 
moral law with regard to the object of metaphysics. 
How moral law and the notion of social contract can construct the theory of 
perpetual peace? Why should we treat a metaphysical law as the foundation of the 
theory of perpetual peace? In commonsense, it seems that it is unnecessary to 
appeal to such metaphysical laws in tackling the problem of right. Many modern 
philosophers, Rawls for instance, take this commonsensical point of view. Though 
Rawls grounds his theory of justice on the Kantian notion that in searching the 
highest good in our reason we regard ourselves as having autonomy, he tries to avoid 
any metaphysical commitment in his theory. 
Moral law, of course, does seem to be a metaphysical principle. However, 
according to Kant, one can consider the law from the metaphysical point of view, 
17 
"On the common saying: Thus may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice," 8: 289-307. 
18 John Rawls claims that "my aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries 
to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant. " in Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed.) (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), p. 10. 
19 Kant's lecture notes show that he is plainly concerned about the role of natural law in the political 
philosophy. See lmmanuel Kant: Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy, trans . Frederick Rauscher 
and Kenneth Westphal. Unfortunately I cannot read the English translation because it is not yet 
published. However, as the translator Rauscher mentions, the issue of natural law in Kant 's lectures 
and drafts on political philosophy is no doubt an important topic. 
See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/ 
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namely, the noumenonal perspective. For Kant, moral law can be regarded as an 
indispensable principle of the ground of right. This law also involves Kant's another 
distinction of freedom, i.e., Wille and Willkur. This distinction refers to the problem 
of freedom in the public sphere. Also, starting from moral law and social contract, 
Kant recasts a new transcendental principle for the public right. In this chapter, I shall 
discuss how Kant tackles the problem of the ground of right in terms of moral law 
and social contract. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first explains the view 
of right as "mine and yours", which is a core notion of Kant's theory of perpetual 
peace. The second examines how Kant transits from natural law to moral law. The 
third discusses the relation between Wille and Willkur. The fourth illustrates how 
Kant refines the notion of social contract as the transcendental principle in the public 
sphere. 
I. Right as "mine and yours" and the level of inter-subjectivity 
Any discussion of the problem of right unavoidably involves a significant notion, 
i.e., inter-subjectivity. This is because by the notion of right we usually assume a 
condition that people perform their freedom in a public sphere, where there are 
many subjects interacting with each other. Hence, in the level of inter-subjectivity, it 
is important to define right in term of the standpoint of each person. lt should be 
noted that in the Kantian practical philosophy system, the term "inter-subjectivity" is 
indeed adopted in talking about the public sphere. In his early texts of practical 
philosophy, e.g., Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals and the second Critique, 
Kant focuses on the faculty (Vermogen) of subjectivity of individual. lt seems that 
there he ignores the problem of inter-subjectivity. As such, it may be illuminating to 
consider from Kant's wording in The Metaphysics of Morals so as to understand 
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whether or not Kant notes the problem in the level of inter-subjectivity.20 
In the first part of the Doctrine of Right of The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
introduces a possessive-pronominal twin expression "dos Mein und Dein" which has 
been translated into English as "mine and yours" or "possession."21 This expression 
firstly occurs after two parallel divisions of rights. Indeed it signifies a systematic 
doctrine and the highest division of rights, which distinguishes human rights into 
natural and positive right and innate and acquired right. For Kant, innate right can be 
construed as what is "internally mine and yours" and acquired right as "externally 
mine and yours." Thus, Mein and Dein is a general expression used by Kant to 
characterize rights from inter-personal perspectives. Freedom as an innate right 
belongs to me, to you and to everyone in human community because of our 
humanity.22 Moreover, considering the human freedom socially in accordance with 
an a priori principle of coexistence can merely yield innate equality. 23 "By putting 
both possessive pronouns Mein and Dein next to one another, Kant was clearly 
declaring that, in point of view of law and justice, a multi- or inter-personal approach 
is mandatory, or that no egoistic perspective should be allowed." 24 
20 I am here largely following the analyses of Tze-wan Kwan, "Towards a Phenomenology of Pronouns", 
in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 5(2), ed . M aria Baghramian (Routledge, 2007), pp. 
258-9. 
21 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 237. The English translation of this expression is "mine or yours". 
However, the German word "und" always refers to English word "and" rather than "or." In fact the 
disjunction "or" would totally violate Kant's intention with this expression, namely, pointing to the 
sphere of mutuality of rights. Thus, this expression should be translated as "mine and yours." 
22 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 237. 
23 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 238. 
24 Kwan, "Towards a Phenomenology of Pronouns", op. tic., pp. 258-9. Also, Mein und Dein also is the 
crucial point of the transition from private right to public right. lt is located at §41 as the beginning of 
Doctrine of Public Right and names "Transition from What is Mine or Yours in a State of Nature to 
What is Mine or Yours in a Rightful Condition Generally." (Obergang von dem Mein und Dein im 
Naturzustande zu dem im rechtlichen Zustande iiberhaupt.) The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 305 . There 
is a little different arrangement between the German and the English versions. The former arranges § 
41 in the beginning of the doctrine of public right, whereas the latter in the end of the doctrine of 
private right. Here I quote the German version. Nevertheless, although there are two arrangements, it 
is plainly that "mine or yours" is a critical transition point from private right to public right. 
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Right is universal for all subjects. The expression of "mine and yours" shows that 
Kant has indeed noted the problem of freedom from the level of subjectivity of 
individuals to the level of inter-subjectivity.25 In his theory of right, the view of "mine 
and yours" is also a crucial notion in transiting from private right to public right. From 
the subtitle of §41 "Transition from what is mine and yours in a state of nature to 
what is mine and yours in a rightful generally", located between the end of the part 
of private right and the beginning of the part of public right, he expands the notion 
of right from a state to the international relation. 26 Thus, from the view of "mine and 
yours," right is of universal nature. All human beings and all states possess their own 
freedom simultaneously, and no one has privilege in fringing upon others' right. 
One can admit that right is "mine and yours," but what is the ground of 
universal right? This problem obviously involves Kant's another significant notion, i.e., 
moral law, to be discussed below. 
11. Moral law as the universal principle of right 
25 The term "inter-subjectivity' is used in contemporary philosophy, especially in Phenomenology and 
Habermas. According to Habermas, there are two conditions in constructing the sphere of 
inter-subjectivity. The first is the symbolic phenomenon that men have capacity for using symbolic and 
for building meaning. The second is the communicative action that men should comply with some 
common rules when they attempt to understand each other. Otherwise, we cannot understand what 
we are doing. While Kant never use the term "inter-subjectivity" in characterizing the public sphere 
and does not discuss those conditions mentioned above, he notes that there are two levels of 
subjectivity, i.e., the level of subjectivity of individual and that of inter-subjectivity. The latter is not 
entire ly equivalent to the former, since some properties of the whole, such as relation between 
subjects, cannot be reduced to its part. Moreover, Cassirer, one of the Neo-Kantianists, develops 
symbolic philosophy inspired by the first Critique Kant's three Critiques also show that there are three 
kinds of principles which corresponded to three different aspects of experience. I believe that Kant's 
philosophy can fulfil I those conditions mentioned above and that I can use the term "inter-subjectivity" 
in th is chapter. 
26 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 305. 
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At the very beginning in the introduction of The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
defines that "right (Recht) is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the 
choice (Willkiir) of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom." 27 lt seems that in some locus he advances natural law as 
the ground of right. 28 However, when we scrutinize the whole introduction, we 
notice that Kant plainly and repeatedly argues that the ground of right is the law of 
freedom, i.e., moral law. And he explicitly argues that categorical imperative, or 
moral law, is the principle of right. 29 In other words, we should appeal to moral law 
in conceiving ground of the right. 
But why should one appeal to some laws in conceiving the right? To answer this 
question, it is useful to consider the meaning of the German word "Recht''. The word 
"Rechtn means justices, right as well as law which reciprocally imply each other. "To 
put it more explicitly, Recht has to do with justice for this man or this sector of people; 
for this to take effect, certain rights of the individual or the sector have to be 
defended; and to uphold rights and justice we need a law that applies equally to all 
men."30 Also, the problem of right inevitably involves the notion of freedom in the 
level of inter-subjectivity such that we can freely act but at the same time will not 
infringe upon the freedom of others. This is amount to saying that the problem of 
right also involves the notion of free will, namely, the cause of action. Thus, the 
ground of freedom no doubt refers to the dispute about the distinction between 
natural law and morallaw.31 
27 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 230. 
28 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 225. 
29 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 377. 
30 Tze-wan Kwan, "Kant's Possible Contribution to Natural Law Debates," in Responsibility and 
Commitment: Eighteen Essays in Honor of Gerhold K. Becker, ed. Tze-wan Kwan (Waldkirch : Ed Gorz, 
2008), p. 206. 
31 Of course, the notion of natural law arouses two significant levels of debates, namely, 
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Additionally, two notions of law should be distinguished, i.e., laws of nature 
(Gesetze der Natur) 32 and natural law (Naturrecht)33 • While the notions of laws of 
nature and of natural law could lead to confusion in English, considering them with 
their original expressions in German will give rise to different senses. In general, 
Gesetze der Natur is used in the scientific sense which refers to laws operating in the 
physical world. The term Naturrecht, on the contrary, is a combination of "Natur'' 
and "Recht," and clearly involves the notion of right. Observations reveal that all 
things in the physical world are strictly bound by some universal laws of nature, e.g. 
Newton's Laws of motion, which will not change at will. In order to tackle the 
problem of right, many philosophers contend that the human being's action should 
also be bound by natural law, just as a thing is bound by laws of nature. Thus, dealing 
with the problem of right or of natural law is to appeal analogically to the laws of 
nature, as indicated clearly in Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative 
in the Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. 34 
Despite the significant role of laws of nature in Kant's philosophy, he endeavors 
to transit from laws of nature to moral law in construing the cause of our action and 
argues that the grounds of right and of freedom lies in the analysis on moral law 
rather than on natural law, which only provides "symbol" or type for the former. For 
Kant, appealing to moral law is to tackle the problem of right and at once to yield 
justice. Thus, I shall first outline how Kant tackles the problem of free will and of 
jurisprudential debates and metaphysical debates. However, in this chapter I shall merely focus on the 
problem of the ground of right. Detail see: Kwan, "Kant's Possible Contribution to Natural Law 
Debates", op . cit., pp.200-204. 
32 Ka nt sometimes uses " Naturgesetze" as alternative. 
33 Kant somet imes uses "das natiirliche Recht'' instead of Naturrecht. 
34 The second formulation of the categorical imperative shall be discussed in what follows. 
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moral law. 
In the first Critique, Kant has already noted the problem between the laws of 
nature and freedom. The Third Antinomy demonstrates such dispute about laws of 
nature and freedom.35 "The question," as Allison suggests, "is not whether nature is 
to be viewed as a dynamical whole (the completeness requirement) but, assuming 
that it must be, how such a whole is to be conceived."36According to this suggestion, 
when the regress is from effect to cause, the question is how we explain the event? 
The thesis of the Antinomy affirms that there is a cause which itself is not 
phenomenal, but a noumenal cause, whereas the antithesis denies the possibility of 
such a cause and focuses on the given sensible data which should be strictly bound 
by categories, or laws of nature. The former indicates that only the phenomenal 
cause is not enough in explaining the event and the latter represents a perspective of 
pure empiricism who merely insists that such noumenal cause would conflict with 
the conditions of possible experience. Subsequently Kant indicates the solution of 
the Third Antinomy that "if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom 
cannot be saved."37 In other words, we can conceive two kinds of causality with 
different perspectives, namely, phenomenal and noumenal perspectives, and they 
are compatible. The Third Antinomy shows that there is a logical space for 
transcendental freedom which is "an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from 
itself'.38 Our actions are not like a machine merely bound by laws of nature, or 
35 Thesis: "Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the 
appearances of the world can be derived. lt is also necessary to assume another causality through 
freedom in order to explain them." Antithesis: "There is no freedom, but everything in the world 
happens solely in accordance with laws of nature." Critique of Pure Reason, A444/B472; A445/B473. 
36 Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (rev. and en/. ed.}, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), p. 379. 
37 Critique of Pure Reason, AS36/BS64. 
38 Critique of Pure Reason, A446/B474. 
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rather they are bound by another law. 
Kant's solution of the Third Antimony leaves room for transcendental freedom, 
but he shows it negatively. In the Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals and the 
second Critique, Kant positively articulates and describes transcendental freedom 
through the notion of imperative. As an agent of action, our actions, or the will, 
should be commended in accordance with an objective practical principle, namely, 
an imperative which is prescribed by practical reason. 39 Imperatives can be 
distinguished into categorical and hypothetical. Taking different imperatives as the 
determining ground would yield different states of the will. On the contrary, if the 
will takes the former, then the will is autonomous which is "the property of the will 
by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of 
volition),"40 whereas, if the will takes the latter, then the will "does not give itself the 
law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it."41 The 
difference between categorical and hypothetical imperatives is whether the object 
affects the will or not. In the former case the will can determine itself sufficiently, 
and in the latter case the reason still imposes the imperative to the will in obtaining 
the object, although the object seems to determine the will completely. In other 
words, no matter what imperatives are imposed to us, we are still "free" to choose. 
For Kant, when we reflect on the moral issues, morality indeed entails 
normative principle, namely that are universal and lawful. Admittedly, only the 
categorical imperative, not the hypothetical imperatives, can satisfy the requirement 
of universality and lawfulness. As mentioned above, although the hypothetical 
39 Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, 4:413. 
40 Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, 4:440. 
41 Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, 4:441. 
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imperative has lawfulness, it focuses on the relationship between the will and the 
object, i.e., the empirical content which is contingent. In Kantian terms, it can "give 
general rules but never universal rules."42 In contrast, the categorical imperative 
merely focuses on the will itself, namely the form of lawgiving, which rules out all 
empirical contents and is for this reason universal. He further explains that the 
categorical imperative must be equivalent to moral law, or unconditional practical 
law, which can be "independent of the law of nature (Naturgesetz) of appearance in 
their relations to one another" 43 We can say "such independence is called freedom 
in the strictest, that is, in the transcendental, sense,"44 and Kant concludes that 
"freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other." 45 
The categorical imperative has five formulas and the first is the well-known 
statement "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal."46 According to the requirement of 
universality, Kant immediately follows in the second formula from the first one to 
show the relationship between moral law and law of nature: 
Since the universality of law in accordance with which effects take place 
constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as regards 
its form) - that is, the existence of things insofar as it is determined in 
accordance with universal laws- the universal imperative of duty can also go as 
follows: act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a 
42 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 36. 
43 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 29. 
44 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 29. 
45 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 29. 
46 Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 421. 
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universal law of nature (zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze).47 
In the second Critique~ Kant indicates that "nature in the most general sense is the 
existence of things under laws."48 One can expand the meaning of nature, which 
includes not only natural events but also our actions, since both of them are also 
determined in phenomenal sense by law of nature. While the motivation of human 
being is difficult to observe, it cannot follow that we act without any rules. In the 
cited passage, Kant explicitly uses the subjunctive phrase "as if" (als ob) to analogize 
law of nature with moral law. As he clearly indicates, the former "shares with the 
latter the same analogy to nature with regard to its universality and lawfulness."49 In 
the second Critique, he attempts to use another strategy, i.e., by introducing the 
concept of the Typic (Typik), 50 to do with the problem of universality and lawfulness 
of moral law. Comparing with the function of the Schematism (SchematimusL which 
shows the procedure of the categories' conduction of the intuitions in constructing 
empirical object, the Typic also shows a procedure in which moral law guards against 
"empirical of practical reason, which places the practical concepts of good and evil 
merely in experiential consequences (so-called happiness)/'51 and "mysticism of 
practical reason, which makes what served only as a symbol into a schema, that is, 
puts under the application of moral concepts real but not sensible intuitions (of an 
invisible kingdom of God) and strays into the transcendent."52 To sum up, our actions 
should be bound in accordance with universal moral law. 
47 Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 421. 
48 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 43. 
49 Kwan, "Kant's Possible Contribution to Natural Law Debates," op. cit., p. 214. 
50 
"The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action 
you propose were to take place by a law of the nature ( Gesetze der Natur) of which you were yourself 
a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will." Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 69. 
51 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 70. 
52 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 70-1. 
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The possibility of free actions is the result of moral law, and free action cannot 
be explained merely by law of nature. As Kant argues, moral law can be deemed as a 
supersensible principle that implies freedom reciprocally. lt seems that Kant's theory 
of freedom would more or less involve some metaphysical components which may 
arise many controversial arguments in contemporary contexts. Indeed, many modern 
political philosophers, say, Rawls, seem to have made attempts to rule out those 
metaphysical components in their theory. In order to avoid dispute of problematic 
metaphysical commitments, Rawls argues that it is simply unnecessary for political 
philosophy to involve itself into such controversial topics. 
We try, then, to leave aside philosophical controversies whenever possible, 
and look for ways to avoid philosophy's longstanding problems. Thus, in what I 
have called "Kantian constructivism," we try to avoid the problem of truth and 
the controversy between realism and subjectivism about the status of moral 
and political values. This form of constructivism neither asserts nor denies 
these doctrines. Rather, it recasts ideas from the tradition of the social 
contract to achieve a practicable conception of objectivity and justification 
founded on public agreement in judgment on due reflection. The aim is free 
agreement reconciliation through public reason. And similarly, as we shall see 
(in Section V), a conception of the person in a political view, for example, the 
conception of citizens as free and equal persons, need not involve, so I believe, 
questions of philosophical psychology or a metaphysical doctrine of the nature 
of the self. No political view that depends on these deep and unresolved 
matters can serve as a public conception of justice in a constitutional 
democratic state. As I have said, we must apply the principle of toleration to 
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philosophy itself. 53 
In this passage, Rawls invokes two main reasons why one should avoid the 
metaphysical arguments. First, no political view necessarily depends on those 
arguments. Second, his aim is merely to recast the social contract through "Kantian 
constructivism", which takes the categorical imperative as a procedure for people in 
reflecting and in determining the moral principle in the public sphere, especially in a 
democratic society.54 Thus, Rawls thinks that we do not have to deal with the 
problem of metaphysics, especially when we focus on the problem of social contract. 
lt seems that Rawls has a point here indeed because there is no relationship between 
metaphysics and political philosophy. Hence, we need not appeal to any 
metaphysical component in conceiving the theory of social contract. 
However, when the context is changed, Rawls's neat avoidance of metaphysics 
seems to be not as consistent as he claims. In A Theory of Justice, the key problem 
shifts from political matters to the characterization of men's nature in his theory of 
justice. Although Rawls argues that no political point of view depends on 
metaphysical doctrines, it is surprising that his theory of justice has already involved 
some metaphysical doctrines. He introduces "the Kantian interpretation" which is 
based on the notion of autonomy, and under which he regards men as free and equal 
rational beings.55 Rawls professes to attempt to avoid any metaphysical arguments, 
yet one might ask him why one should construe agents as free and equal in the 
Kantian sense. 
53 Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", in Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 395. 
54 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosoph~ ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000) , pp. 238-241. 
55 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Rev. ed}, op. cit., p. 221. 
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As Kant repeatedly argues, one could consider the agent from either 
phenomenal or noumenal perspective. If he attributes freedom to a being 
considered merely as a phenomenal object, then every action of the agent is 
determined in time, and "one cannot, so far at least, except this being from the law 
of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and consequently as to its actions 
as well; for, that would be tantamount to handling it over to blind chance."56 As the 
antithesis of the Third Antinomy shows, everything must be explained by law of 
nature, in which freedom would be a null and impossible concept. 57 If the actions 
can be reduced to a phenomenal cause, then the actions do not make sense to us 
because they are only a collection of physical conditions and one finally cannot 
distinguish "my action" from "your action". 
For Kant, if one attempts to save freedom, one must "ascribe freedom to the 
same being as a thing in itself."58 If one is responsible to her actions, then it should 
be assumed that she acts freely. Although the categorical imperative, freedom and 
autonomy cannot be observed since they are not sensible data given to us, they are 
the necessary grounds in construing and in conceiving the actions and morality. One 
has to consider morality from the noumenal perspective.59 In other words, one 
should assume that our actions involve some degrees of freedom because one freely 
chooses the maxim. Thus, freedom and moral law in the transcendental level can be 
56 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 95. 
57 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 95 . 
58 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 95. 
59 The distinction between phenomenon and noumena is not a substantial distinction regarding to 
two real worlds; it is, rather, a methodological distinction of two perspectives in conceiving the same 
object. Regarding the discussion on the problem of the noumenal perspective, see Henry Allison, 
Kant~s Transcendental Idealism (rev. and en/. ed.) op. cit.; Chong-fuk Lau, "Freedom, Spontaneity and 
Noumenal Perspective," in Kant-Studien 99 Jahrg., (Berlin: Waiter de Gruyter 2008), pp. 312-38. 
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regarded as "practical postulates" which must be assumed for the possibility of our 
actions.60 In a word, one cannot construe the action agent without freedom and 
moral law. Thus, Rawls, on the one hand, borrows some significant elements from 
Kant's theory of freedom and, on the other hand, attempts to rule out any 
metaphysical doctrine in those elements. He focuses on recasting the theory of social 
contract; even so, he should still find it difficult to avoid all metaphysical perspective 
or dispute. 
11. Freedom in public sphere: the distinction between Wille and Willkiir 
The primary problem of right in the level of inter-subjectivity is how to 
guarantee subjectivity of everyone even since people will be easily infringed upon 
their freedom in the public sphere. For Kant, the problem of right is how to protect 
freedom of each subject and, simultaneously, to ensure that, in accordance with 
moral law, the subjects will not infringe upon the freedom of others. The sense of 
freedom at the level of inter-subjectivity is different from that at the level of 
subjectivity of individual. The former focuses on whether one can freely choose, 
whereas the latter on whether one can be self-determining. lt seems that, to an 
extent, they are two kinds of freedom, but in reality they are two sides of the same 
coin. When one can freely choose, it must be assumed that she can be 
self-determining. Accordingly, in order to explicate the problem of freedom in the 
level of inter-subjectivity, Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals raises the distinction 
between Wille and Willkur:61 
6
° Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 46. 
61 Kant uses the terms Wille and Willki.ir to characterize different functions of a same faculty of 
volition and refers the faculty to Wille. Thus, Wille has both a broad sense and a narrow sense and it 
will create some problems for the translator. As Allison mentions, there are two main strategies in the 
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The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground 
determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty 
to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases. Insofar as it is joined with one's 
consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's action it is called 
choice; if it is not joined with this consciousness its act is called a wish. The 
faculty of desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, 
lies within the subject's reason is called the will. The will is therefore the 
faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but 
rather in relation to the ground determining choice to action. The will itself, 
strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine choice, 
it is instead practical reason itself.62 
Here Kant plainly defines the meanings of Wille and of Willkiir. 63 The former is 
equivalent to practical reason, or the faculty of legislation, and the latter is the 
faculty of choice. We should note that Kant does not mean that there are two 
standard English translations for dealing with this problem. One is to translate Wille as "will" and 
Willkiir as "choice"; the other is to translate Wille as "will" and Willkiir as "willw." See Allison, Kant's 
Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.129. However, in order to avoid 
confusion, I simply follow the German terms. 
62 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 213. "Das Begehrungsvermogen nach Begriffen, sofern der 
Bestimmungsgrund desselben zur Handlung in ihm selbst, nicht in dem Objekte angetroffen wird, 
hei~t ein Vermogen nach Belie ben zu tun oder zu lassen. Sofern es mit dem Bewu~tsein des 
Vermogens seiner Handlung zur Hervorbringung des Objekts verbunden ist, hei~t es Willkiir; ist es 
aber damit nicht verbunden, so hei~t der Aktus desselben ein Wunsch. Das Begehrungsvermogen, 
dessen innerer Bestimmungsgrund, folglich selbst das Belieben in der Vernunft des Subjekts 
angetroffen wird, hei~t der Wille. Der Wille ist also das Begehrungsvermogen, nicht sowohl (wie die 
Willkur) in Beziehung auf die Handlung, als vielmehr auf den Bestimmungsgrund der Willkur zur 
Handlung betrachtet, und hat selber vor sich eigentlich keinen Bestimmungsgrund, sondern ist, sofern 
sie die Willkur bestimmen kann, die praktische Vernunft selbst." 
63 Kant redefines the distinction because using Wille and Willkiir is not coherent in his mora l 
philosophy. For example, in Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals he characterizes autonomy as 
"die Autonomie des Willens" and heteronomy as "die Heteronomie des Willens"; in the second Critique 
he explains the notion of will with three words namely Wille, Willkiir and Wollen . And the expression 
of autonomy is "die Autonomie des Willens" and of heteronomy is "die Heteronomie der Willkiir". 
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separated faculties of desire; the problem is about, rather, two different functions of 
the same faculty. In order to show this, Kant expediently divides it into Wille and 
Willkiir and analyzes their roles in the faculty of desire respectively. As the source of 
norm, Wille prescribes both categorical and hypothetical imperatives to Willkiir. 
Construing from their different functions, Kant suggests that Willkiir is free because it 
would adopt either categorical or hypothetical imperative as its determining ground. 
Wille is neither free nor unfree since "[Wille] is not directed to actions but 
immediately to giving laws for the maxims of actions."64 And thus, we can describe 
Willkiir as being free. "The relationship between maxims and objective practical 
principles in analogous to the relationship in the theoretical realm between empirical 
concepts as first-order rules for the unification of the sensible manifold and the pure 
concepts or categories as second-order rules governing the formation of empirical 
concepts."65 
Furthermore, Kant attempts to define the notion of Willkiir with pure Wille: 
That choice which can be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That 
which can be determined only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would 
be animal choice (arbitrium brutum). Human choice, however, is a choice that 
can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of 
itself (apart from an acquired proficiency of reason) not pure but can still be 
determined to actions by pure will. Freedom of choice is this independence 
64 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 226. ,Von dem Willen gehen die Gesetze aus; von der Willkur die 
Maximen. Die letztere ist im Menschen eine freie Willkur; der Wille, der auf nichts anderes, als bless 
auf Gesetze geht, kann weder frei noch unfrei genannt werden, weil er nicht auf Handlungen, sondern 
unmittelbar auf die Gesetzgebung fur die Maxi me der Handlungen (also die praktische Vernunft selbst) 
geht, daher auch schlechterdings notwendig und selbst keiner Notigung fdhig ist. Nur die Willkur also 
kann frei genannt werden." 
65 Allison, Kant/s Theory of Freedom, op. cit., p. 88. 
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from being determined by sensible impulses; this is negative concept of 
freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason 
to be of itself practica I. 66 
As the passage indicates, Willki.ir would be affected, but not entirely determined, by 
sensible object. Otherwise, it is animal Willki.ir rather than human Willki.ir. In other 
words, we should conceive Willkur as something that more or less involves freedom. 
Also Kant repeatedly characterizes Willki.ir with negative and positive senses of 
freedom and in terms of pure Wille, that is, moral law. While it may appear that 
Willki.ir is equivalent to autonomy, one should note that Willki.ir "consists in 
spontaneity rather than autonomy."67 This is because, firstly, Kant merely means that 
it could, but not must, be determined rather than must be determined by pure Wille 
{holy will), and following this, secondly, Kant acknowledges that Willki.ir can act in 
two directions, that is, in the right use as well as and misuse of freedom. 
Going back to the sphere of inter-subjectivity, Kant indicates that the problem of 
freedom, or of right, is related to external rather than internal actions. 58 Accordingly, 
the main notion of freedom in the public sphere is Willki.ir rather than Wille, since, 
from the view of "mine and yours," we mainly consider whether or not we can freely 
choose different maxim, and do not lead everyone to purge their motivations. 
66 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:213-214. " ... die Willki.ir, die durch reine Vernunft bestimmt werden 
kann, heisst die freie Willkur. Die, welche nur durch Neigung (sinnlichen Antrieb, stimulus) 
bestimmmbar ist, wurde tierisch Willkur (arbitrium brutum) sein. Die menschliche Willkur ist dagegen 
eine solche, welche durch Antriebe zwar affiziert, aber nicht bestimmt wird, und ist alo fur sich (ohne 
erworbene Fertigkeit der Vernunft) nicht rein, kann aber doch zu Handlungen aus reinem Willen 
besimmt werden. Die Freiheit der Willkur ist june Unabhaengigkeit ihrer Bestimmung furch sinnliche 
Antriebe; dies ist der negative Begriff derselben. Der positive ist: das Vermogen der reinen Vernunft 
fur sich selbst praktisch zu sein." 
67 Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, op. cit., p. 132. 
68 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 231. 
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Otherwise the sphere of inter-subjectivity will be reduced to the sphere of 
subjectivity of individual in which the relationship between subjects will be ruled out. 
This is amount to saying that although there is only one faculty of desire, different 
senses of freedom will correspond to different levels of subjectivity. Kant, thus, 
indicates that {(the conformity of an action with the law of duty its legality {legalitas); 
the conformity of the maxim of an action with a law is the morality (moralitas)." 69 In 
the level of inter-subjectivity, we would merely put others under obligation, and the 
law will constrain people so that they will not infringe upon the rights of others, 
instead of requiring others to act in accordance with duty. 
According to the notions of Willkur in the level of inter-subjectivity, the notion of 
freedom can be reformulated as: 
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar 
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal 
law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his 
humanity.70 
From this new formulation, Kant defines that {(any action is right if it can coexist with 
everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a 
universal law/'71 and that {(right is the limitation of the freedom of each to the 
condition of its harmony with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in 
69 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 225. 
70 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 237. 
71 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 230. 
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accordance with universallaw."72 
Ill. Original Contract and a transcendental principle of public right 
Having explained the ground of right in terms of moral law, Kant proceeds to 
characterize right in light of the notion of contract in order to construct the public 
right which "is merely the condition of an actual legislation in conformity with [ ... ] a 
universal law of freedom."73 Historically speaking, comparing to the monarchy in the 
medieval era, the notion of contract was no doubt a new perspective in political 
philosophy. Taking the notion of contract, philosophers attempted to explain the 
right of people and the authority of government in terms of natural law (Naturrecht) 
or moral law rather than divine right. 
Despite this progress of perspective, one may still doubt whether the notion of 
contract can apply to the problem of the international relationship between states. 
For many, it seems that the notion can merely apply to the external relation between 
people in a commonwealth rather than between states. However, for Kant, applying 
the notion of contract to the international relation is possible. In Toward perpetual 
peace -A Philosophical Project, Preliminary article No 2, "No independently existing 
state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, 
exchange, purchase or donation", Kant argues that the state should also participate 
into the contract: 
For a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium) . 
72 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 290. 
73 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 292. 
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lt is a society of human beings that no one other than itself can command or 
dispose of. Like a trunk, it has its own roots; and to annex it to another state as 
a graft is to do away with its existence as a moral person and to make a moral 
person into a thing, and so to contradict the idea of the Original Contract, 
apart from which no right over a people can be thought. 74 
Here Kant indicates that we should treat the state as a moral person rather than as 
goods, and it will contradict the idea of the Original Contract if we take a state as a 
belonging. Admittedly, this suggestion follows from the third formula of categorical 
imperative, i.e., "so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."75 
In the public sphere, there must be some common affairs in which many subjects are 
involved. Since everyone is a moral subject, unless one is authorized by others, one 
cannot arbitrarily order another to do or not to do. To do justice to common affairs, it 
is important to see to it that one subject should not infringe upon the right of anther 
and that a government or organization be authorized to represent the people to 
implement measures in public. In other words, as long as there are common affairs, 
no matter whether they involve people or states, _ we can conceive the external 
relation in light of the notion of contract. 
Nevertheless, the notion of the Original Contract will ra ise another problem no 
matter whether it happens in history or not. Many philosophers, e.g. Hobbes, 
Rousseau and Locke, introduce the notion of social contract largely to solve the 
problem of right. In their theories, the notion of social contract is characterized as a 
74 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 344. 
75 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 429. 
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situation where everyone in the original position is free and equal. In the same 
society, people inexplicitly sign a contract, surrendering some of their own rights to 
the government. Hence, in the public sphere, every rational agent is bound by rules 
of the contract and the government has the power to execute measures. The 
problem of such a theory, however, is that these philosophers usually characterize 
such origin of contract as if it had happened in history. This alone could lead to a host 
of problems. One of the problems is this: if it had never happened in the past, why 
should one accept the theory of social contract? For those who adopt the notion of 
social contract as the starting point of their theory, they should respond to a 
counter-question, namely, what the ground of validity of the contract is, if it is not 
even a historical fact. 
Kant also notices this serious problem and offers such an explanation: 
Now this is an Original Contract, on which alone a civil and hence thoroughly 
rightful constitution among human beings can be based and a commonwealth 
established. But it is by no means necessary that this contract [ ... ] be 
presupposed as a fact [ .. . ] lt is instead only an idea of reason, which however, 
has its undoubted practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give his 
laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole 
people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he 
has joined in voting for such a will. For this is the touchstone of any public law's 
conformity with right. 76 
As he argues here, advancing the idea of contract is for explaining the external 
76 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 297. 
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relation among subjects. Kant explicitly indicates that the notion of "Original 
Contract," which means that "the basic law ... can arise only from the general (united) 
will of the people,"77 is merely an idea of reason rather than a historical fact, and 
this very rational idea itself constitutes the foundation of all public right. The 
function of Original Contract shows that we behave socially and politically as if we 
have signed a contract by which we merely obey to our own reason rather than to 
any authority, and by which we constrain ourselves voluntarily. 
Moreover, Kant discusses what rightful principles of the Original Contract are. 
Following from moral law and Willkur, he outlines three rightful conditions of the 
Original Contract as follow: 
1. Mutual freedom for happiness: As Kant declares in the second Critique, "all 
material practical principle as such are, without exception, of one and the 
same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one's own 
happiness."78 Since everyone can have a different understanding of what a 
happy life should be, "no one can coerce me to be happy in his way (as he 
thinks of the welfare of other human beings); instead, each may seek his 
happiness in the way that seems good to him, provided he does not infringe 
upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone in accordance with a possible universal law (i.e., does 
not infringe upon this right of another). 79 Abstracting all empirical contents 
from all subjects, the first rightful condition is that "The freedom of every 
77 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 295. 
78 Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 22. 
79 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice, 8: 291. 
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member of the society as a human being."80 lt is permissible for one to 
search her happiness given that she does not infringe upon the right of 
others. 
2. Social equality: Consider the position of everyone in the community. The 
second rightful condition following from the first condition is: "His equality 
with every other as a subject."81 Kant notes that people might have different 
talents, riches and hereditary prerogatives. In one word, those inequalities 
between people are yielded by luck. However, in terms of the view of right as 
"mine and yours" and the categorical imperative, which entails equality, we 
underlie the right which merely focuses on the legislative form rather than 
the matter of the object. Otherwise, if the notion of right is grounded on luck, 
we no doubt infringe upon others' right. Hence, on the one hand, "each 
member of a commonwealth has coercive rights against every other,"82 on 
the other hand, "every member of a commonwealth must be allowed to 
attain any level of rank within it (that can belong to a subject) to which his 
talent, his industry and his luck can take him; and his fellow subjects may not 
stand in his way by means of a hereditary prerogative (privileges [reserved] 
for a certain rank), so as to keep him and his descendants forever beneath the 
rank."83 
3. Independence of citizen: The third condition is: "The independence of a 
member of a state as a citizen."84 Protecting everyone's freedom and equality 
should be done in accordance of laws. "All right," Kant points out, "that is to 
80 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 290. 
81 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice, 8: 290. 
82 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 291. 
83 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 292 . 
84 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice~ 8: 290. 
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say, depends upon laws."85 But who establish the laws? The laws are not 
established by the governor of state, but by all citizens as colegislators.86 "A 
public law that determines for everyone what is to be rightfully permitted or 
forbidden him is the act of public will, from which all right proceeds and 
which must therefore itself be incapable of doing wrong to anyone."87 As 
defined here, we can say that public law is endorsed by citizens who sign the 
Original Contract. 
Admittedly, when Kant singles out these three rules, he does not take empirical 
contents into accounts. As he repeatedly argues, as the grounds of the Original 
Contract, these principles are legislated by pure reason and have no regard for any 
empirical ends, "since people differ in their thinking about happiness and how each 
would have it constituted, their wills with respect to it cannot be brought under 
common principle and so under any external law harmonizing with everyone's 
freedom."88 In other words, the validity of the notion of social contract is based on 
practical reason rather than empirical facts. 
For Kant, the introduction of the notion of Original Contract is not only to 
elucidate the grounds of civil state, but also to appraise whether or not the public law, 
political system as well as international organization are established in just. "Had it 
first been asked what is laid down as right (where principles stand firm a priori and 
no empiricist can bungle them), then the idea of the social contract would remain in 
its incontestable authority, not however as a fact [ ... ] but only as a rational principle 
85 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 294. 
86 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 294. 
87 On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice, 8: 294. 
88 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 290. 
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for appraising any public rightful constitution."89 He provides the following useful 
example: 
Now the legislator can indeed err in his appraisal of whether those measures 
are adopted prudently, but not when he asks himself whether the law also 
harmonizes with the principle of right; for there he has that idea of the Original 
Contract at hand as an infallible standard, and indeed has it a priori (and need 
not, as with the principle of happiness, wait for experience that would first 
have to teach him whether his means are suitable). 90 
The idea of Original Contract is not derived from experience, nor the notion of 
happiness. Kant here obviously indicates that the idea of Original Contract, or the 
principle of right, legislates a priori. lt is not only an idea, but also a rational principle 
for judging the relationship between people as well as between states. 
Although inner right is "mine and yours," there are some people or states that 
may abuse this right by making some secret agreements between them only. These 
agreements would likely relate to ways of infringing upon other's rights and interests, 
and cause people or states to be suspicious of one another. More than often, such 
secret agreements are detrimental or at least unfair to other people and states. This 
state of mistrust easily leads to warfare.91 In order to remove such mistrust and 
prevent injustice, Kant advances another condition to bound maxims of people and 
of states. Abstracting from everything empirical that the concept of the right of a 
89 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 302. 
90 On the common saying: That may be correct in theor~ but it is of no use in practice, 8: 299. 
91 For Kant, the mistrust is the main cause of war. I shall discuss this in chapter 3. 
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state or the right of nations contains,92 and in accordance with the principle of right 
and the idea of Original Contract, Kant presents us with the essential condition that 
is missed in the earlier situation- the form of publicity (Publizitiit). The notion of 
publicity is an a priori condition which involves in every claim to right, "since without 
it there would be no justice (which can be thought only as publicly known) and so too 
no right, which is conferred only by justice."93 
Hence, in virtue of the form of publicity, Kant casts a new transcendental 
principle of public right: 
All actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is 
incompatible with publicity.94 
All maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) harmonize 
with right and politics combined.95 
The former is negative and the latter positive. The focal point of these two 
principles is whether or not our maxims are compatible with others' maxims in the 
public sphere in accordance with the view of "mine and yours". As discussed above, 
according to the moral law and the reformulation of freedom, this new 
transcendental principle, which is the ground of the possib ility of sense of justice, is 
no doubt a reformulation of moral law and a new expression of the Willkur in the 
level of inter-subjectivity. Therefore, this transcendental principle at the level of 
92 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 381. 
93 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 381. 
94 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 381. 
95 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 386. 
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inter-subjectivity is a new constitutive principle which, as Kant terms, constitutes its 
object, namely, a rightful social and law system. Also we can say that our sense of 
justice is derived from the transcendental principle of public right . 
The preceding discussions try to reveal how Kant construes the notions of 
freedom as well as Willkur in light of moral law, and how he recasts the moral law to 
the new transcendental principle of public right. We search and constitute perpetual 
peace in accordance with the principle of public right. In other words, this principle is 
the ground of perpetual peace. However, in view of the face that in history the 
process of perpetual peace seem to have been always in regression, one may ask 
what condition can guarantee that we will search perpetual peace permanently. In 
the next chapter, I shall examine how Kant tackles this difficult problem. 
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2. Nature's guarantee of perpetual peace and the notion of 
purposiveness 
After discussing the three definitive articles, 96 Kant attaches the two 
supplements to the project of perpetual peace. Of this two supplements, more 
confusing is the first, named "the guarantee of perpetual peace/' in which he 
introduces the notion of purposiveness (Zweckmafligkeit). Kant only spends a little 
space in articulating the meaning of the notion. A misunderstanding of this peculiar 
arrangement is that Kant argues purposiveness as the guarantee, yet he construes 
war as a preliminary work, which seems to be that Kant adheres to war. This 
perplexing supplement, of course, raises an objection. Human beings should strive 
for perpetual peace by themselves and do not need any purposiveness, construed as 
God's will or intelligent design in general, which is redundant in theory of perpetual 
peace. 
Admittedly, this objection raises a problem posed in the third Critique. Kant terms 
the problem as an "incalculable gulf" (uniibersehbare KluftL which is "fixed between 
the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept 
of freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by 
means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible."97 For Kant, this 
can be a problem because, in accordance with the laws of freedom, morality entails 
actualization the end, i.e., the highest good, in the sensible world. In other words, 
the end at least can be conceived to be realized in nature.98 Thus, Kant introduces a 
96 The three definitive articles will be discussed in chapter 3. 
97 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 176. 
98 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 176. 
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mediating concept, the notion of purposiveness, which makes possible the transition 
from the concept of nature to the concept of freedom. 99 
The objection obviously neglects the discussion in the third Critique, especially 
the notion of purposiveness. In this chapter, I shall attempt to spell out its function in 
the theory of perpetual peace. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first 
considers how nature constitutes the guarantee of perpetual peace. The second 
examines a criticism put forward by Martha C. Nussbaum. The third scrutinizes the 
reasons why Kant introduces the notion of purposiveness into his theory of perpetual 
peace. 
I. The preliminary argument of the guarantee: war as a means of nature 
At the beginning of the supplement, Kant suggests "this guarantee (Gewahr) 
(surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature (Kiinstlerin Natur) (natura daedala 
rerum)." 100 One can call it either fate, considered as mechanical course 
purposiveness, or providence, profound wisdom of a higher cause to the objective 
final end of the human race. Kant deliberately takes the latter for the concept of 
purposiveness. However, since here he proceeds to deal with the problem solely in 
theoretic, but not of religious, perspective, he suggests the word "nature" instead of 
"providence." He then divides the argument into two parts, i.e., "preliminary work of 
nature for peoples" and "a method of nature". 
99 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 195-6. 
100 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 360. "The great artist of nature" plainly 
involves the notion of technique of nature and I shall discuss it later. 
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In general, Kant regards human race as a class of animal and depicts preparatory 
arrangements of nature in three aspects: First, Peoples are able to live in all regions 
of the earth, even in barren climes in terms of genera;101 Second, Nature has 
separated peoples into every part of the world by means of war, and has ensured 
that they are inhabited even in the most inhospitable places; Third, She also has 
forced human beings to adopt some form of legal order in some degrees by war. 102 
Obviously, Kant here focuses on the function of war and further indicates a point that 
the first instrument of war is connected with the domestication of horses as well as 
peoples' development of agriculture and commerce. In other words, he links the 
development of culture with wars. Furthermore, some peculiarly, he understands 
war as something noble, to which humans are motivated by honor rather than 
self-seeking motives. Historically speaking, although wars arose from different causes, 
e.g. contending for resources, expanding domains and self-seeking, honor, especially 
national honor, is no doubt one of the most important causes since war were often 
begun merely for showing off courage. Hence, it seems that war has an inner dignity 
in itself.103 
As a Latin adage said, "If you wish for peace, prepare for war (Si vis pacem, para 
bellum)." Kant, however, merely construes that war was the means of nature for 
separating peoples. As in the preliminary articles for perpetual peace in Section 1, he 
explicitly suggests that "Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be abolished 
101 For example, the moss which grows in the frozen wastes of the Arctic can be nourishment for 
reindeer and reindeer also can be nourishment for Samoyeds. See Toward Perpetual Peace-A 
Philosophical Project, 8:363. This explanation, with Kant own terms in the third Critique, explicitly 
involves a notion of external purposiveness that one thing in nature serves another as the means to 
an end . I shall discuss this later. 
102 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 363. 
103 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 365. 
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altogether."104 While war is caused by human honor and seems to be worthy to seek, 
he at the end of this segment cites the Greek's admonition that "war is bad in that it 
makes more evil people than it takes away." 105 Kant, thus, is in fact plainly against 
war. 
All of these, to the last analysis, are propaedeutic to Kant's main consideration, 
that is, nature's contribution to human being's moral end, especially public right. He 
indicates that nature wills something to happen whether the human being likes it or 
not. His point is clear that "nature comes to the aid of the general will grounded in 
reason, revered but impotent in practice." 106 In other words, nature forces peoples 
themselves into rule of law through the mechanism of human beings, that is, 
self-seeking inclinations by which Kant asserts that the human being will develop 
commerce.107 Undoubtedly, a peaceful environment is a necessary condition for 
developing commerce. War and commerce are incompatible by nature. As a result, 
people will establish the republican state since it has low possibility to declare war. 108 
Even though many difficulties are in the process of establishing the republican state, 
the state will finally appear in according to nature's means. As Kant optimistically 
claims, "the problem of establishing a state, no matter how hard it may sound, is 
soluble even for a nation of devils (if only they have understanding)."109 
Kant's argument appears to be that nature has its own substantial will which 
conducts the operation of the natural and humanistic world. Nevertheless, one 
104 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 345 . 
105 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 365 . 
106 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 366. 
107 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 368. 
108 The merit of the republican state and the development of commerce will be discussed in chapter 
3. 
109 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 366. 
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should keep in mind that Kant always characterizes the notion of nature's will or 
purposiveness in the subjunctive mood in the supplement, namely, with the famous 
Kantian phrase "as if" (als ob). 110 This expression can often be transposed into 
"if ... would" structures.111 In other words, the notion of purposiveness should not be 
construed as the substantial will; or rather, as Kant suggests, we may analogize 
nature to a designed product in light of the notion of purposiveness. 
11. The objection against the guarantee 
Although one recognizes the function of war and the will of nature, it remains a 
problem why one should after all appeal to this concept in search for the guarantee 
of perpetual peace. Naively or not, it seems that perpetual peace will somehow 
appear in the world automatically. Should not we endeavor for perpetual peace by 
means of practical reason? In a recent research, Martha C. Nussbaum directly 
disagrees with Kant's argument of the guarantee of perpetual peace. 
Nussbaum's argument is rather acute and systematic. First of all, she believes 
that Kant is deeply affected by Titus Lucretius Carus, a Roman philosopher (99 
BCE-55 BCE), because he characterizes nature with a Latin phrase, natura daedala 
rerum, which comes from Lucretius's De Rerum Natura. 112 Nevertheless, it seems 
doubtful as to whether he introduces a teleological point of view which is against 
110 Such as : " ... the sandy wastes contain salt for the camel, which seems as if created for travelling in 
them ... " (8 : 363); " ... states f ind themselves compelled ... to promote honorable peace and, whenever 
war threatens to break out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by mediation, just as if they were in a 
permanent league for this purpose." Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 363; 368. 
111 Kwan, "Kant's Possible Contribution to Natural Law Debates," pp. 213-4. 
112 Martha C. Nussbaum, " Kant and Cosmopolitianism", in, Perpetual Peace: Essays on KantJs 
Cosmopolitan Idea, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1997), p. 41. 
40 
Lucretius's anti-teleological one. Comparing their views, Nussbaum finds that, while 
Lucretius understands war as disordered and nonprovidential, Kant construes it as a 
part of nature's providential design. She thus asserts that "Kant follows closely the 
course of Lucretius's actual argument denying providential design in nature, but 
simply asserts the contradictory at every point"113 
Further, she expresses deep skepticism of the role of purposiveness in the 
theory of perpetual peace: 
Do we need to follow Kant in alluding to providence as at least a practical 
postulate, a reasonable hope, if we wish either to be cosmopolitans or to 
persuade others that they should define themselves in accordance with 
cosmopolitan aims and aspirations? I believe we do not. Humanity can claim 
our respect just as powerfully whether we think the universe is intrinsically 
well ordered or whether, with Lucretius, we think that things look pretty 
random and unprovidential. However humanity emerged, whether by design 
or by chance, it is what it is and it compels respect. In a sense there is a special 
dignity and freedom in the choice to constitute our community as universal 
and moral in the face of a disorderly and unfriendly universe, for then we are 
not following anyone else's imperatives but our very own. 114 
Nussbaum thus suggests that certain core concepts of Kant's moral philosophy, such 
as categorical imperative, moral law, freedom and so further, can be separated from 
this sort of wishful thinking. In other words, there is no relationship between moral 
113 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitianism", op. cit., p. 41. 
114 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitianism", op. cit ., p. 43. 
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theory and purposiveness with regard to the issue of perpetual peace. As a result, 
she maintains that one does not need to appeal to the hope of Providence, and that 
one should merely focus on the moral core of Kant's moral philosophy. In addition, 
the guarantee undermines the moral duty because everything, including the human 
being, is entirely determined by nature which is independent of all effort of human 
beings. In other words, this guarantee is incompatible with moral duty. 
Regarding Kant's locution, Nussbaum's argument seems tacitly to assume that if 
someone invokes a phrase from a classical text, then the meaning of the very phrase 
would be literally equivalent to its precedent in that classical text. In many cases, 
such an assumption is of course right, but in the present context, it is not. Even 
though Kant is affected by Lucretius and they use the same expression, it does not 
mean that Kant is Lucretius's strict adherent. 
Nussbaum's criticism of the role of purposiveness seems to have a point indeed. 
Kant's argument of the guarantee of perpetual peace seems to be a perplexity. As 
we discussed in chapter 1, the problem of perpetual peace involves the notion of 
public right and the view of right as "mine and yours.': One thus should approach the 
issue by means of practical reason rather than purposiveness. Also, as Nussbaum 
indicates, we need not consider whether the world is intrinsically well ordered if we 
only want to define ourselves according to cosmopolitan aims, which involve 
practical reason rather than purposiveness. Hence, for Nussbaum, the notion of 
purposiveness in the theory of perpetual peace is redundant. 
Kant is no doubt in agreement with the notion that we should legislate in order 
to protect public right through practical reason. Nussbaum nevertheless neglects 
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Kant's discussion of the function of the purposiveness in the third Critique. In his 
works of moral philosophy, Kant of course never intends to use purposiveness for 
constructing public right. 
To begin with an anti-argument against Nussbaum, one has to make clear with 
regard to the sense of guarantee. Considering the sense of the guarantee carefully, it 
has two grounds and only one of them involves teleology. The first is that the 
problem of building up a republican state must be solved because it is not a matter 
of moral improvement but of technical rationality, that is, the power of money. 115 
That is why Kant optimistically believes that the problem, even for that nation of 
devils with intelligence, can be solved. Even though the problem can be solved, the 
process of solving may be suspended. Hence, Kant introduces the second ground, the 
teleological one, that nature will permanently compel human beings to tackle the 
problem, which includes arranging the conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions with 
constraining one another. 116 In other words, nature, as it holds a torch to us, treats 
human being as if it will compel us to attain perpetual peace if we endeavor through 
practical reason under the guidance of the notion of right. Kant's argument is clear 
that nature does not rule out moral duty, i.e., nature is merely independent of moral 
endeavor rather than of all human endeavor. Thus, the guarantee and moral duty 
are compatible. 
After spelling out the function of the purposiveness in perpetual peace, it still 
remains the question why Kant introduces the notion of purposiveness. In what 
follows, I shall try to trace the question back to the third Critique and other relevant 
115 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 368. 
116 Toward Perpetual Peace-A Philosophical Project, 8: 366. 
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essays by Kant. 
Ill. The technique of nature, purposiveness and the final end 
According to the third Critique, the meaning of purposiveness is the "lawfulness 
of the contingent as such." 117 This lawfulness of the contingent involves a very 
important notion of Kant's Critical philosophy, namely reflective judgment. A few 
words are in order for this regulative judgment. 
In the first Critique, Kant characterizes the regulative principle as "a principle of 
reason which, as a rule, postulates what should be effected by us in the regress, but 
does not anticipate what is given in itself in the object prior to any regress."118 
Clearly, the regulative principle, which merely applies to phenomenon rather than 
object in itself, is an operative postulate if we take an exercise of regression on 
empirical objects. In other words, this "is not a principle of the possibility of 
experience and of the empirical cognition of objects of sense ... [but] a principle of 
the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience." 119 
Kant further elucidates the function of the regulative principle in the third 
Critique. In order to show the nature of the principle, I cite two paragraphs from two 
versions of the introduction to the third Critique. In the First Introduction, he argues 
that: 
The power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for reflecting 
117 
"First Introduction", 20: 217. 
118 c . . .Fp I ntlque o1 ure Reason, A509 B537. 
119 Critique of Pure Reason, A509/B537. 
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on a given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake 
of a concept that is thereby made possible, or as a faculty for determining an 
underlying concept through a given empirical representation. In the first case it 
is the reflecting, in the second case the determining power of judgment. 120 
And in the Second Introduction: 
If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law} is given, then the power of 
judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even when, as a 
transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions a priori in 
accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal}, 
is determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal 
is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting. 121 
Kant compares the two kinds of power of judgment, i.e., determinative and reflective 
judgments. The determinative judgment refers to the issue either that sensible data 
is constituted through categories or practical laws determinate the maxim of will to 
yield good or evil. This is to say that the determinative judgment subsumes the 
particular under given universals. As Kant famously discussed in the first two 
Critiques, the power of judgment, guided either by categories or by freedom, can 
constitute two kinds of object, i.e., theoretical and practical. By contrast, the 
reflective judgment represents a regression from the empirical objects, in searching 
for universals. In other words, if the power of judgment is independent of categories 
and freedom, it will give itself a principle a priori, that is, the notion of purposiveness 
120 
"First Introduction", 20: 211. 
121 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 179. 
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of nature. This judgment can tackle experience which is neither theoretical nor 
practical, such as beautiful, sublime, religious sentiment, hope and all that. 
However, it is still puzzling as to how the reflective judgment applies to our 
experience? A crucial point is that reason tends to cognize experience or nature as a 
system and as a unity, rather than disjointed aggregate in accordance with empirical 
laws. Kant indicates that: 
Although experience constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental 
Jaws, which contain the condition of the possibility of experience in general, 
there is still possible such an infinite multiplicity of empirical laws and such a 
great heterogeneity of forms of nature, which would belong to particular 
experience, that the concept of a system in accordance with these (empirical) 
laws must be entirely alien to the understanding, and neither the possibility, 
let alone the necessity, of such a whole can be conceived. Nevertheless 
particular experience, thoroughly interconnected in accordance with constant 
principles, also requires this systematic interconnection of empirical laws, 
whereby it becomes possible for the power _ of judgment to subsume the 
particular under the general, however empirical it may be, and so on, right up 
to the highest empirical laws and the forms of nature corresponding to them, 
and thus to regard the aggregate of particular experiences as a system of 
them.122 
Transcendental laws refer to categories that only focus on the form of object rather 
than its empirical content. These laws, however, cannot deal with the problem of 
122 
" First Introduction", 20: 203. 
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diversity of empirical objects. Kant in this cited passage argues that the "systematic 
interconnection of empirical laws" cannot be obtained without the notion of 
purposiveness, according to which particulars are connected with each other as the 
system. lt seems that reason intends to synthesize all objects as a system not only in 
the transcendental level but also in the empirical level. One should note Kant's 
characterizing of this interconnection as "lawlike". 123 In the footnote, Kant indicates 
that the notion of purposiveness is not merely mechanical but also technical. The 
notion "yields subjective principles that serve as a guideline for investigation of 
nature."124 lt is technical in that we conceive nature as the system in light of the 
notion of "the technique of nature (Technik der Natur)". 125 This important 
conception analogizes nature with art, and treats nature as if deliberately designed. 
lt seems to be easier in discussing the notion of guideline than of the technique of 
nature and I shall investigate the notion of guideline first. 
The function of guideline shows that we construe nature with the guidance of 
the notion of purposiveness. One should keep in mind that the function of reflective 
judgment is to find universal from given particulars. As Kant suggests, this search for 
universals is either for classifying particulars in terms of species and genera or for 
finding empirical laws in terms of which the behavior of particulars can be 
explained.126 As Hannah Ginsborg observes, these two types of universal, namely, 
the hierarchical orders in terms of species and genera and the systematic 
organization of empirical laws, are closely connected with the notion of 
123 
"First Introduction", 20: 203. 
124 
"First Introduction", 20: 204. 
125 
"First Introduction", 20: 204. 
126 
"First Introduction", 20: 214; 234. 
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purposiveness. 127 In other words, one should at least assume that these particulars 
are connected in some degrees as a system when we intend to distinguish them 
systematically. Also, analyzing reflective judgment from another aspect is that the 
judgment is "to compare and to hold together given representations either with 
others or with one's faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made 
possible."128 
Thus, the function of reflective judgment can be characterized in two senses. On 
the one hand, it is to search universals from given particulars and, on the other hand, 
it is to compare and to hold together given particulars. Considering these two senses 
together, one can easily recognize that this kind of judgment is similar to inductive 
inference. In light of this point of view, I shall investigate Kant's doctrine of inductive 
argument in the Ji:isch Logic so as to clarify the meaning of reflective judgment for 
Kant.129 
Kant treats inductive argument as a mode of reflection, 130 and suggests that 
there are two species of such a mode of inference, namely, induction and analogy. 
The former infers from the particular to the universal according to the "principle of 
universalization": "What belongs to many things of a genus belongs to the remaining 
ones too."131 The latter infers from a similarity of two things with a particular 
attribution to a total similarity according to the "principle of specification": "Things 
of one genus, which we know to agree in much, also agree in what remains, with 
127 Hannah Ginsborg, The Role of Taste in Kant's Theory of Cognition (New York and London : Garland 
Publishing Company, 1990), p. 190. 
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which we are familiar in some things of this genus but which we do not perceive in 
others." 132 And these principles govern the inferences of reflective judgment, 
namely, "that the many will not agree in one without a common ground, but rather 
that which belongs to the many in this way will be necessary due to a common 
ground ."133 
These principles can be restated, in contemporary language, that "they are the 
vehicles through which predicates are 'projected', either from some instances of x to 
all x's {induction), or of a given x on the basis of other predicates already known to 
pertain to that x {analogy)." 134 These two kinds of inference conform to two senses 
of reflective judgment indicated above. To claim "that the many will not agree in one 
without a common ground" means that empirical regularities are not entirely 
contingent but shows fundamental order of nature. This common ground obviously 
contains the notion of purposiveness. Classifying empirical objects into hierarchical 
order in light of genera and species is no doubt significant in our experience. Food 
chain, as a general concept in empirical science, is a typical example for unfolding 
the hierarchical order. We compare properties of organisms and classify them into a 
concept which is itself genera with same property. Then we classify those concepts 
into other concepts in a higher level as genera, such as the plant the herbivore, the 
carnivore and the omnivorous animal, and finally they constitute the hierarchical 
order in which there are certain relationship between lower species and higher 
genera. Consequently, every concept is itself both genus and species through the 
notion of purposiveness. 
132 The Jdsch Logic, 9: 133. 
133 The Jdsch Logic, 9: 132. 
134 Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2001}, p. 35. 
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Taking transcendental philosophy holistically, one easily sees that there is 
another important reason why Kant in his third Critique appeals to the notion of 
purposiveness. That is, purposiveness helps to deal with a problem that, as indicated 
before, is the "incalculable gulf". lt is instructive to consider this problem in relation 
to epistemological problem of systematization. Kant points out that: 
For the multiplicity and diversity of empirical laws could be so great that it 
might be possible for us to connect perceptions to some extent in accordance 
with particular laws discovered on various occasions into one experience, but 
never to bring these empirical laws themselves to the unity of kinship under a 
common principle, if, namely, as is quite possible in itself (at least as far as the 
understanding can make out a priori), the multiplicity and diversity of these 
laws, along with the natural forms corresponding to them, being infinitely 
great, were to present to us a raw chaotic aggregate and not the least trace of 
a system, even though we must presuppose such a system in accordance with 
transcendentallaws. 135 
This chaotic scenario is similar to a scenario posed in the first Critique. The problem 
of chaotic disorder indeed involves at two levels which, as Allison names, are 
"transcendental chaos" and "empirical chaos". 136 The "transcendental chaos" locates 
in the "Transcendental Deduction" in the first Critique. Besides dealing with a 
problem of objective validity of the categories, which "yield conditions of the 
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possibility of all cognition of objects",137 the Deduction also attempts to tackle a 
problem of disorder at the transcendental level. This is because "appearances could 
after all be so constituted that the understanding could not find them in accord with 
the conditions of its unity". 138 Hence, Kant attempts to show that the possibility of 
the object simultaneously must be subject to the conditions of the transcendental 
unity of apperception, namely, categories of understanding. 
On the contrary, the "empirical chaos" cannot be solved by categories since they 
are merely the constitutive form of the object instead of being concerned with 
particular as such. Categories after all do not translate its function into empirical 
level. In short, categories cannot support inductive inference. Therefore, operations 
of classification and of induction with particulars are impossible unless we 
presuppose nature as the system with sufficient uniformity. Eventually, these 
operations entail a distinct transcendental principle, namely, the notion of 
purposiveness for unifying at the empiricallevel. 139 
Following the understanding of the function of guideline, we can go back to the 
notion of technique of nature. As is discussed above, operations of classification and 
of induction with particulars must assume nature as "systematic interconnection". 
From this point of view, Kant analogizes nature as if it is a profoundly designed 
product. And that is the notion of technique of nature. He mentions that it "only 
grounds a maxim for the power of judgment".140 In other words, the reflecting 
power of judgment construes nature in light of the notion. "Thus the power of 
137 Critique of Pure Reason, A89-90/B122. 
138 Critique of Pure Reason, A90/B123. 
139 Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, op. cit., p. 
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judgment itself makes the technique of nature into the principle of its reflection a 
priori, without however being able to explain this or determine it more precisely or 
having for this end an objective determining ground for the general concepts of 
nature (from a cognition of things in themselves), but only in order to be able to 
reflect in accordance with its own subjective law, in accordance with its need, but at 
the same time in accord with laws of nature in general."141 
The notion of technique of nature can be related to the principle of the 
reflecting power of judgment. Comparing with the determining power of judgment, 
although the notion of the technique of nature is principle a priori, it is entirely 
different from another two constitutive principles, namely categories and freedom. 
Kant names both constitutive principles as "nomothetic" (Nomothetik). 142 And he 
explicitly indicates the following with regard to what the essence of legislation of the 
reflecting power of judgment is: 
Strictly speaking, one must call this legislation heautonomy (Heavtonomie), 
since the power of judgment does not give the law to nature nor to freedom, 
but solely to itself, and it is not a faculty for producing concepts of objects, but 
only for comparing present cases to others that have been given to it and 
thereby indicating the subjective conditions of the possibility of this 
combination a priori.143 
In the cited passage Kant injects a new word "heautonomy" to explain such 
legislation . Comparing with both determining and reflecting power of judgments, 
141 
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they involve spontaneity of subject, but in different levels. The former legislates to 
nature and to freedom, that is, nomothetic of nature and of freedom, whereas the 
latter merely legislates to subject's own reflection. In other words, the former is 
objectively valid and the latter is subjectively valid. 
One can further consider two procedures of the power of judgment: the 
Schematism (Schematimus) and the symbolic (symbolischL 144 or technicism of 
nature (Technicism der Natur). 145 The former is a "faculty of subsuming under 
rules" 146 which refers to the categories. The Schematism shows how the 
understanding combines itself with intuition and conducts intuition to arrange given 
manifolds. On the contrary, the latter is also a procedure but it proceeds merely by 
means of analogy. The symbolic procedure consists of "first applying the concept to 
the object of a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of 
reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only 
the symbol."147 In other words, this procedure itself indicates that the form of 
reflection yields indirect presentations of the concept. "The reflecting power of 
judgment/' as Kant explicitly points out, "proceeds with given appearances ... not 
schematically, but technically, not as it were merely mechanically, like an instrument, 
but artistically."148 Accordingly, one can figure out that the symbolism or technicism 
is merely a procedure of analogizing, which guides us to analogize given objects as 
profoundly designed. 
From the historical viewpoint Kant's teleology argument seems to be another 
144 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 351. 
145 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 413. 
146 Critique of Pure Reason, A132/B171. 
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version of Aristotle's doctrine of final cause for the explanation of all particulars in 
metaphysics. Kant might agree with this point, but Kant's doctrine is indeed 
differently grounded. First, as indicated in the preceding discussion, Kant claims the 
notion of purposiveness with subjunctive mood for nature as if it is purposive, 
whereas Aristotle asserts that nature is purposive. Second, the notion of 
purposiveness can be related merely to our "mode of reflection" in the same way we 
would reflect nature. 
The complexity also leads to another distinction between objective universality 
and subjective universality. Objective universality only focuses on the possibility of 
the object no matter whether it is of theoretic or practical sense, whereas subjective 
universality is concerned with searching universals from given particulars. In the 
preceding discussion, it is clearly seen that reflective judgment focuses on given 
particulars rather than concerns possibility of the object. In other words, reflective 
judgment has merely subjective universality rather than objective universality. This 
explains why Kant names it "mode of reflection" and use subjunctive mood in 
expressing the notion of purposiveness. On the contrary, Aristotle argues that the 
notion of purposiveness has objective universaUty and he investigates such 
universality by means of speculative reason. In sum, one can say that, while the two 
philosophers both claim purposiveness, they indeed have different forms of 
universality in mind. 
I shall investigate below how Kant conceives the meaning of purposiveness. He 
distinguishes between the principle of internal purposiveness and that of external 
purposiveness. According to Kant, the former claims that "an organized product of 
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nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally a means as we/1," 149 
while the latter maintains that "one thing in nature serves another as the means to 
an end."150 By definition, internal purposiveness merely refers to the individual 
organized being. By contrast, external purposiveness refers to all things in nature 
whether they are organisms or not. As mentioned in the preceding discussion on war, 
Kant argues that war serves as the means to perpetual peace and this argument 
conforms to the definition of external purposiveness. Therefore, the guarantee of 
perpetual peace involves external purposiveness and I shall only focus on this 
principle. 
With regard to this principle, Kant further distinguishes two senses in which the 
human race can be deemed as an end. The first sense is the ultimate end (Jetzter 
Zweck) of nature, which entails the human being as a species can judge all natural 
things as the system. Only the human being is the ultimate end in nature since "he is 
the only being on earth who forms a concept of ends for himself and who by means 
of his reason can make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed 
things."151 As defined here, culture also can be regarded as ultimate end of nature 
because it is a "production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in 
genera 1."152 
As mentioned more than once, Kant construes war exactly as a cultural 
discipline because war could be caused by honor that involves great degree of 
149 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 376. The later expression is more clearly that: "The definition 
of an organic body is that it is a body, every part of which is there for the sake of the other 
(reciprocally as end and, at the same time, means). lt is easily seen that this is a mere idea, which is 
not assured of reality a priori (i.e. that such a thing could exist) ." In Opus postumum, 21: 210 
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rational end. However, as Kant argued repeatedly also, war is merely the preliminary 
work for the human being in entering the lawfulness state. Kant says plainly, "while 
the evil that is visited upon us partly by nature, partly by the intolerant selfishness of 
human beings, at the same time calls forth, strengthens, and steels the powers of 
the soul not to be subjected to those, and thus allows us to feel an aptitude for 
higher ends, which lies hidden in us."153 A decisive point here is that, although 
human being, as a sensible being, may be evil, she, also as a rational being, is at once 
conscious of some powers derived from her practical reason, and this power directs 
to the higher end. 
This higher end, as the second sense of the end, obviously points to the final 
end (Endzweck) which "needs no other as the condition of its possibility." 154 
However, it seems confusing why Kant suddenly introduces this end since he posits 
the notion of ultimate end for reflecting the nature as a system. One thus should 
consider the principle of external purposiveness and the ultimate end again. While 
the notion of ultimate end is advanced by the human being, who seems to take the 
view that the end only serves for the human being, every species indeed can be 
treated as means according to the principle of external purposiveness. Kant gives an 
example that "humankind exists in order to establish a certain balance among the 
productive and destructive powers of nature by hunting and reducing the number of 
[the carnivores]."155 Admittedly, in order to establish a certain balance of nature, 
the human being can be a means. In order words, the human being can be either the 
end or the means depending on what the contexts would be. 
153 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 434. 
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Also, according to Kant, the ultimate end, which is applied merely to mechanism 
of nature to explain the physical possibility of things, cannot elucidate an 
intentionally acting cause (absichtlich wirkenden Ursache} which involves freedom 
which is a principle of action.156 Thus, the ultimate end pertaining to the human 
being needs further proof for its objective ground, i.e. the final end. As mentioned 
above, considered from the phenomenal perspective, the final end cannot be found 
in the empirical world since the human being can either be the end or be the means. 
Nevertheless, considered from the noumenonal perspective, the human being can 
be regarded as final end in accordance with moral law which is the only conceivable 
candidate.157 Kant thereafter identifies the highest good with the final end, i.e. 
happiness in harmony with morality. This is the final end for us that we can attain the 
highest good in the world through the use of our freedom. 158 By combining this end 
or guarantee with moral law, they would yield a project which guide us progressively 
in attaining perpetual peace. 
lt seems that Kant dogmatically dictates that the highest good must be 
actualized in the phenomenon world. Nevertheless, Kant in the whole discussion of 
the notion of purposiveness merely shows the possibility of actualizing highest good, 
rather than dogmatically affirms it. In "Idea for a universal history with a 
cosmopolitan aim", Kant positively characterizes several propositions which unfold 
the final end as a plan that affects us in conceiving human being and nature. 
Instances include, say, the fifth: "The greatest problem for human species, to which 
nature compels him, is the achievement of a civil society universally administering 
156 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 434. 
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158 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 450. 
57 
right." ;159 the seventh: "The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is 
dependent on the problem of a lawful external relation between states and cannot 
be solved without the latter.";160 and the eighth: "One can regard the history of the 
human species in the large as the completion of a hidden plan of nature to bring 
about an inwardly and, to this end, also an externally perfect state constitution, as 
the only condition in which it can fully develop all its predispositions in humanity."161 
These propositions can be deemed as supplements to the guarantee of perpetual 
peace. 
IV. Reflective judgment as a directive force 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that Kant's guarantee of perpetual 
peace merely pertains to reflective judgment, through which one classifies 
particulars in terms of genera and species. One reflects nature in the most general 
sense, as indicated above, by means of the notion of purposiveness, and construes 
all particulars as a system or hierarchical order. By reflecting particulars in such a 
manner, one projects the notion of purposiveness, especially the final end, into 
nature as if it intends to actualize its end through different means, including even war. 
And also we can conceive that different genera and species support the realization of 
the end . One should keep in mind that such notions, as purposiveness, intelligent 
design, God, etc. merely possess subjective universality, which focuses on mode of 
reflection or particulars as such rather than the possibility of object in general. Thus, 
the notion of purposiveness, as a "heuristic principle,"162 demonstrates its regulative 
function in our mind conceiving nature in such a manner. By interpreting, the 
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guarantee merely ensures that the human beings would gradually attain perpetual 
peace, in which nature, as it were, compels and guides us to actualize it. 
Although one can construe the notion of purposiveness as the operative 
postulate of the guarantee in Kant's theory of perpetual peace, some may argue that 
this is only "wishful thinking" since it can never be realized. However, according to 
Kant's view, perpetual peace, like the latter Habermas's argument on the notion of 
modernity, is an incomplete project. Although perpetual peace is very difficult to 
attain and mistakes are unavoidable, the human being must overcome problems by 
means of reason. 163 Perpetual peace can however be construed as a notion of 
direction towards which the human being exerts her endeavor. Also, the notion of 
purposiveness is a necessary concept for expressive power. In ordinary language, we 
always express "I hope" when we try to realize something. Thus, it is our postulate 
not only of the mode of reflection, but also of our expressive power. Admittedly, this 
responds to the question advanced in the Jtisch Logik: What can I hope? (Was dart 
ich hoffen ?) 
However, one may still suspect that the process of perpetual peace might be 
reversible, since one can hardly find any firm direction to guiding her towards the 
actualization of a perpetually peaceful end. One may thus be forgiven for thinking 
that Kant may be too optimistic in his view on the development of the human being. 
163 
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Indeed, Moses Mendelessohn (1729-86}, who was opposed to Kant's view, claims 
that "we see the human race as a whole make small oscillations, and it never takes a 
few steps forward without soon afterward sliding back twice as fast into its former 
state." He clearly contends that the human race will never make moral progress. Kant 
response to Mendelessohn's view as below: 
I shall therefore be allowed to assume that, since the human race is constantly 
advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived 
as progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its 
existence, and that this will indeed be interrupted from time to time but will 
never be broken off. 164 
This paragraph indicates that Kant is confident of the human being's moral progress 
toward a better state. As discussed earlier, the notion of purposiveness, which 
regulates us in construing nature and in realizing the end, essentially includes an 
irreversible direction. Kant explicitly focuses on the form, or the general process, of 
the development rather than the historical evolvement. In other words, the notion of 
purposiveness posits a constant direction in the process of searching for stability and 
order in terms of hierarchical order. Kant argues that perpetual peace will finally be 
attainable, at least reflectively, because all activities of culture must involve human 
will that implies purposiveness. As long as the development of culture involves 
purposiveness, the process of perpetual peace is irreversible. 
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3. Appraising the Project of Perpetual Peace 
In the preceding chapters, I have investigated two transcendental principles of 
Kant's theory of perpetual peace. lt may be appropriate now to consider what type 
of measure we need to enact in actualizing perpetual peace. Measure and rules help 
to contrive some condition of peace, and , for Kant, ua condition of peace among 
men living near one another is not a state of nature (status natura/is), which is much 
rather a condition of war, that is, it involves t~e constant threat of an outbreak of 
hostilities even if this does not always occur."165 In the project of perpetual peace, 
Kant indeed advances some substantial measures under the name of "six preliminary 
articles" and "three definitive articles". The present chapter shall look into these 
measures in two parts respectively. The first discusses the meaning and role of 
perpetual peace and the six preliminary articles, the second focuses on the three 
definitive articles. As the three definitive articles seem much more controversial 
within the entire project, they will be the central topic of the chapter. 
I. The definition of perpetual peace and the six preliminary articles 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Kant argues that the grounds of 
perpetual peace lay in two transcendental principles, namely, the principle of 
publicity, which is the reformulation of moral law at the level of inter-subjectivity, 
and the regulative principle, which regulates our mind in construing nature as a 
system in accordance with the notion of purposiveness. For Kant, the combination of 
these two principles would yield the process of the project of perpetual peace. To 
begin with, one needs a clear understanding of the meaning and the role of the 
165 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 349. 
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notion of perpetual peace. 
While the title of his 1795 essay was Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Project, it seems that Kant did not spend much space on the topic. Two years later, in 
The Metaphysics of Moral, he ·tackled the notion more deliberately with his 
substantial explanation and combination of the concept of "perpetual" and "peace." 
In the appendix of "The Doctrine of Right," Kant defines the "Perpetual 
Foundations." He says that "it is called perpetual if the statute for maintaining it is 
bound up with the constitution of the state itself."166 Moreover, in the conclusion of 
the doctrine, Kant specifies that "morally practical reason pronounces in us its 
irresistible veto: there is to be no war, neither war between you and me in the state 
of nature nor war between us as states."167 In order to achieve "the end of all 
hostilities,"168 and thus perpetual peace, it is necessary for the human being to 
establish the constitutions to maintain both a lawful internal state and external 
relations among states. 
What, then, is the role of perpetual peace? "The question is no longer whether 
perpetual peace is something real or a fiction, and whether we are not deceiving 
ourselves in our theoretical judgment when we assume that it is real."169 lt is an 
"unachievable idea,"170 or, rather, merely a rational idea. Meanwhile, one can regard 
it as "continual approximation (Annoherung)." 171 As Kant points out, although 
166 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 367. 
167 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 354. 
168 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 343. 
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perpetual peace is unachievable, one must endeavor to establish perpetual peace 
and the kind of constitution which is "republicanism of all states."172 According to 
the "continual approximation", Kant is confident that there are some tasks of 
perpetual peace which can be accomplished, e.g. grounding the right of human 
beings and of states. 173 Thus, the role of the notion of perpetual peace, as a rational 
and perfection idea, can be deemed as the directive force of the whole theory. 174 
After discussing the meaning and the role of the notion of perpetual peace, we 
can now examine the project of perpetual peace. Kant advances totally nine articles 
for putting an end to war and for achieving perpetual peace. Among them, the six 
preliminary articles refer to the former objective and three definitive articles to the 
latter. First let's consider the six preliminary articles, listed below: 
1. No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret 
reservation of material for a future war. 
2. No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired 
by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation. 
3. Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be abolished altogether. 
4. No national debts shall be contracted with regard to the external affairs of 
a state. 
5. No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of 
172 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 354. 
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another state. 
6. No state at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as 
would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of 
this kind are employing assassins (perduellio) or poisoners (venefici), 
breach of surrender, incitement to treason (perduellio) within the enemy 
state, and so forth. 175 
One can construe these articles from two perspectives. On the one hand, based on 
Kant's subsequent detailed explanations of the articles, these six articles can be 
deemed as causes of warfare. I thus attempt to classify them into three causes, i.e. 
(1). causes of infringing upon the sovereignty of another state (Article 2 and 5), (2). 
causes of apparent threat to another state (Article 3 and 4), and (3) causes of 
mistrust between states (Article 1 and 6). Although Kant expatiated on these articles 
in the eighteenth century, it is easy for contemporaries who retrospect our historical 
experiences to see that these causes have also affected the development of 
international order in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the modern 
era, for example, European states have signed secret numerous reservations and 
expanded their armed forces. And the two militant alliances, i.e. the Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente, served as notorious examples of such international 
conspiracies.176 The assassination of Ferdinand's in Sarajevo, eventually, intrigued 
the long hatred between the two military camps and led to the outburst of World 
War I. A careful interpretation of recent European history may lead one to agree that 
Kant indeed had offered some essentially correct insights in analyzing the causes of 
war. 
175 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 343-347. 
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Another perspective concerns the degree of emergency in implementing the 
measures. As discussed above, the situation of individual states is evidently full of 
mistrust. In order to disperse this atmosphere, Kant makes a distinction between the 
six articles. Thus, although all one of these articles are "laws of prohibition {leges 
prohibitivae)," 177 article 1, 5 and 6 must be enacted at once without need to 
consider different circumstances for "putting a stop to an abuse at once,"178 whereas 
the other articles, article 2, 3 and 4 can "[take] into consideration the circumstances 
in which they are to be applied, subjectively widen his authorization (leges latae) and 
contain permissions, not to make exception to the rule of right, but to postpone 
putting these laws into effect, without however losing sight of the end."179 To 
implement articles 2, 3, 4 later is strictly permitted unless "implementing the law 
prematurely counteracts its very purpose."180 Naturally, the "very purpose" points to 
whether those measures would prevent the war or not. For example, as Kant 
explains in article 2, it is no doubt a right decision to restore the freedom of colonies, 
which shows that we respect each state not as an asset but as a moral person. 181 
However, judging from the history of the independence of colonies, e.g. the cases of 
Cambodia, Myanmar, etc. things could become chaotic when suzerains hurriedly 
leave and prematurely bequeath freedom to the former colonies. Without proper 
sequence, the colony can seldom enjoy its freedom, and worse, there could even be 
civil wars. 182 Hence, in implementing these articles, especially articles 2, 3, 4, one 
should take the situation of the states into full consideration. 
177 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 347. 
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11. The division of public right and the three definitive articles 
The main idea of Kant's project of perpetual peace is to construct three levels of 
public right, or, as he puts it, three definitive articles. Judging superficially, it may 
seem that the six articles are sufficient in establishing perpetual peace, and that the 
three definitive articles are superfluous. For Kant, however, the three definitive 
articles are necessary because without them the state actualized by the former six 
articles is still merely a "state of nature (status naturalis)," 183 i.e., "it involves the 
constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur."184 
One should note that those six preliminary articles, or "laws of prohibition," are 
negative in nature in their aim of achieving peace, in that they only state how the 
hostilities between people and states are to be prevented, but not how perpetual 
peace should be established. In order to establish perpetual peace constructively, the 
three definitive articles are thus positive and prescriptive in nature. 
Given the reasons mentioned above, in the footnote, Kant sets forth the three levels 
of public right as follows: 
Any rightful constitution is, with regard to the persons within it, 
1. one in accord with the right of citizens of a state (Staatsbiirgerrecht), of 
individuals within a people (ius civitatis), 
2. one in accord with the right of nations (Volkerrecht), of states in relation to 
one another (ius gentium), 
3. one in accord with the right of citizens of the world (Weltbiirgerrecht), 
183 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 349. 
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insofar as individuals and states, standing in the relation of externally 
affecting one another, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of 
mankind {ius cosmopoliticum). 185 
The explanations of each right show that this division is not made at will. lt is based 
on consideration of the right as "mine and yours" in all possible external situations 
with regard to the notion of perpetual peace. 186 "For if only one of these were in a 
relation of physically affecting another and were yet in a state of nature, the 
condition of war would be bound up with this, and the aim here is just to be freed 
from it."187 For Kant, this is amount to saying that if these three levels of public right 
are well established, all war can permanently be prevented. In what follows, I shall 
discuss these definitive articles one by one. 
A. The first definitive article: "The civil constitution in every state shall be republican 
(Die burgerliche Verfassung in jedem Staate soli republikanisch sein)." 
In regard to the three rightful conditions mentioned in Chapter 1, if one deems 
all people as moral subjects, then only the republic derived from the Original 
Contract can embody people's freedom, equality and independence. Based on the 
same conditions, it will yield a republican constitution which will likely lead to 
perpetual peace. Kant offers a nice example in elucidating its merit: 
When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide 
whether there shall be war or not {and it cannot be otherwise in this 
185 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 349. 
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constitution), nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to 
begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon 
themselves all the hardships of war (such as themselves doing the fighting and 
paying the costs of the war from their own belongs, painfully making good the 
devastation it leaves behind, and finally - to make the cup of troubles 
overflow- a burden of debt that embitters peace itself, and that can never be 
paid off because of new wars always impending).188 
According to the republican constitution, all citizens have a right to vote for public 
affairs which include e.g. whether or not to declare a war. Kant believes that most of 
citizens in the republic would naturally vote not to involve into wars, since citizens 
will deliberately calculate the possible consequence and come to the awareness that 
wars cost a high price that they cannot afford. On the contrary, for the 
non-republican state, the ruler who is not a member of the state (Staatsgenofle) but 
its proprietor (Staatseigentiimer) possess unlimited power and can "decide upon war, 
as upon a kind of pleasure party, for insignificant cause, and can with indifference 
leave the justification of the war, for the sake of propriety, to the diplomatic corps, 
which is always ready to provide it."189 
Comparing the two kinds of states in this manner admittedly involves the 
problem of the form of government. Kant further divides the forms of state "either 
according to the different persons who have supreme power within a state or 
according to the way a people is governed by its head of state."190 The former refers 
to the form of sovereignty, which can be further divided into three kinds, as 
188 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 350. 
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autocracy, aristocracy and democracy, namely, the power of a prince, of a nobility 
and of a people.191 The latter refers to the form of government of a state, i.e. either 
republican or despotic. "Republicanism is the political principle of separation of the 
executive power (the government) from the legislative power,"192 and "despotism is 
that of the high-handed management of the state by laws the regent has himself 
given ."193 
Obviously, Kant is rather an adherent of republicanism than of despotism 
because the former possesses a higher possibility that its members are capable of 
revising and preventing any evil consequence (although the citizens may choose to 
declare a war). The latter, as Kant criticized, handles the public will as its private will, 
and is in contradiction with the general will and freedom. In other words, in 
despotism, legislative authority is deprived of the power to constrain the power of 
despotism which infringes upon people's right. With this understanding, for Kant, 
democracy, in the strict sense, is equivalent to despotism since "it establishes an 
executive power in which all decide for and, if need be, against one (who thus does 
not agree) so that all, who are nevertheless not all, decide."194 As for sovereignty, no 
matter whether it is in autocracy or aristocracy, so long as if its government complies 
with the spirit of the representative system, i.e., the executive is separated from the 
legislative entity, it could be deemed as republicanism. In other words, if the form of 
government is not representative (reprasentativ), it is without form (Unform). 195 This 
may account for the fact that Kant highly appreciates Frederick 11 (Fried rich der Groge, 
191 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 352. Here Kant uses "democracy" which means 
the political system implemented in the ancient Greek rather than in the modern. 
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1712-1786), the King of Prussia, who said that "he was only the highest servant of 
the state."196 
Comparing with despotism, the focal point of the representative system is that 
the executive power is strictly bound by the legislative power, and that the executive 
cannot declare wars at will. In addition, the system is the only one in conformity with 
the notion of right. In order to achieve perpetual peace, Kant thus argues that every 
state can hope to finally raise itself to republicanism by gradual reforms. 197 Of course, 
republicanism might declare wars, too. Here Kant merely argues that in the case of 
the representative system the possibility of declaring wars is much lower than that of 
despotism. As a matter of fact, while there have been two World Wars in the 
twentieth century, fights among republican states were rare. 198 
As Kant suggests, we hope that all states can be republican. In reality, many 
states nevertheless violate the spirit of the representative system, and this usually 
results in despotism and totalitarianism. With such extreme means as nuclear 
weapons, despotism and totalitarianism could threaten international society with 
dramatic increasing hostility. How can republican states deal with such non-republic 
states? Do we have the right to take means in preventing their threatening actions? If 
we are forced to use armed force to stop these non-republican states' terrorist 
196 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 352. 
197 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 353. 
198 For a detailed account of the international relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see 
F. H. Hinsely ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 11 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1962) and C. L. Mowat ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968). Of course, scarcity of warfare among republican states does not mean scarcity 
of warfare between republican and non-republican states. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
in order to show off their national glory, republic European states, British and France for instance, 
have invaded Asian and African nations more than once, and eventually those Asian and African 
nations became colonies. lt should be noted that elsewhere Kant indeed anticipated such serious 
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means, it seems that we ourselves would violate preliminary article 5. Kant does not 
note this problem in the first definitive article. lt is tackled by the next article, to 
which I shall turn now. 
B. Second definitive article: "The right of nation shall be based on a federalism of 
free states (Dos Volkerecht soli auf einen Foderalism freier Staaten gegrundet 
sein)." 
As preliminary article 2 indicates, we should treat a state not as an asset but as a 
moral person, otherwise it will contradict the idea of the Original Contract. In 
accordance with this attitude, in together with the idea of the Original Contract, Kant 
further argues that all republican states should establish a constitution similar to a 
civil constitution, namely, a league of nations (Volkerbund). 199 
The reason for establishing such a constitution is simple that it can assure the 
right of states in terms of the view of right as "mine and yours." In a civil society, if 
someone infringes upon another's right, he can appeal to legal procedures. 
Comparing with the example, in the natural or non-civil environment, there is no 
legal procedure to tackle with the right of states and each state must appeal to war in 
assuring its right. However, righteousness plainly cannot be determined by war and 
its favorable outcome, victory. Even if after a war, states sign a treaty, it is merely to 
bring end to a specific war, not to human warfare once for all. However, according to 
. moral law, assuring the right of state is a duty of itself that helps it out of lawless 
condition. Therefore, in accordance with the idea of the Original Contract, one 
should establish the constitution to guarantee lawfulness. And Kant argues that 
199 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 354. 
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"there must be a league of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league 
(foedus pacificum), and what would distinguish it from a peace pact (pactum pacis) is 
that the latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war 
forever." 200 
One can regard Kant's doctrine of the league of nations as a criticism of the 
notion of balance of power. Kant writes: 
Now, the only possible remedy for this is a right of nations, based on public law 
accompanied by power to which each state would have to submit (by analogy 
with civil right, or the right of a state, among individuals); for, an enduring 
universal peace by means of the so-called balance of power in Europe is a mere 
fantasy, like Swift's house that the builder had constructed in such perfect 
accord with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow 
alighted upon it. 201 
In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, the notion of balance of power was officially 
advanced and it almost dominated the whole diplomacy among European states in 
the nineteenth century. In order to prevent warfare, many powerful states believed 
that they could mutually bind each other if they had equal military power. 
Unfortunately, the notion of balance of power actually came to be a major cause for 
the powerful states' expansion of armed forces. This notion cannot prevent war but 
precipitates war instead. 202 Seriously, it violates the notion of right of the state. 
200 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 356. 
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Considering in terms of the idea of the Original Contract, if international diplomacy is 
concerned more about the right of state than the power of state, it may ease the 
tension between the states. 
However, one may argue that each state has its own sovereign right which 
cannot be infringed upon. In establishing the league of nations, the states' sovereign 
right must be partly abandoned and therefore this requirement will infringe upon the 
right of state. Some states, in participating in international organizations, often use 
infringement of their sovereign right as an excuse in refusing to fulfill decisions from 
such organizations. In the most extreme cases, they may even raise objection against 
the establishment of such organization. 
This kind of hostile arguments assumes that establishing the league of nations is 
equivalent to infringing upon the sovereign right and that the state is in opposition to 
international order. There are two replies to them: 
1. The nature of Original Contract: The situation is similar to the relation between 
the citizen and the state. As discussed in chapter 1, according to the function of 
Original Contract, the citizen obeys her own reason rather than any authority. 
The rightful constitution derived from the notion of Original Contract can 
embody the citizen's right. To participate in the contract does not mean that the 
citizen's right is to be infringed. On the contrary, the citizen participates in the 
contract in order that she can be assured of her external freedom. By definition, 
"right is the limitation of the freedom of each to the condition of its harmony 
with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance with 
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universal law."203 Based on the same reason, the sovereign right of the state, 
regarded as a moral person, should be compatible with other states, and the 
state in the Original Contract can be assured of its right. 
2. The scope of common affairs: The league of nations should be established 
because there are always some common affairs that involve all states. Thus 
besides embodying the right, freedom and independence of a moral subject, one 
significant function of the rightful constitution is to deal with common affairs. 
One should note that the scope of a constitution will correspond to the scope of 
common affairs involved. In ancient times, because of the constraints of 
transportation problem, common affairs would usually be limited within the state, 
and people of different states would establish mutually independent civil 
constitutions. Following the development of science and technology, in modern 
times, many common affairs, say the problems of environmental protection, 
hygiene, human right, could occur not only within a state, but also among states 
and across continents. In other words, the scope of common affairs would 
expand from a state to the world and there should be an association of states to 
tackle them at once. 
After responding to the problem of establishing the league of nations, I now turn to 
discuss the distinction between the "league of nations" and the supposed "state of 
nations." From the discussion above, one may theoretica lly expects that Kant may 
advance the notion of the state of nations in conceiving international order. However, 
it seems that Kant disagrees with establishing such a state, and he repeatedly argues 
t hat we need is the league of nations ( Volkerbund) instead of the state of nations 
( Volkerstaat) . 
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In arguing for such a view, Kant focuses on a characteristic of the notion of the 
state in general, namely, "the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior 
(obeying, namely the people)."204 lt means that the state is a mean by which the 
superior, authorized by citizens, imposes public coercive laws on the inferior. If the 
state of nations is established, then it means that we build another sovereign right 
upon each state. Thus, Kant argues that the notion of the state of nations would 
contradict the notion of federalism of free states. Additionally, the state of nations is 
entirely difficult to manage, as Kant explains, "if such a state made up of nations 
were to extend too far over vast regions, governing it and so too protecting each of 
its member would finally have to become impossible, while several such corporations 
would again bring on a state of war." 205 
Nevertheless, I believe that the reasons mentioned above are at best of 
technical importance. They alone do not mean that the notion of state of nations is 
unworthy to seek. In the last of the explanation of the second article, Kant explicitly 
put forward another and more significant reason: 
In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one 
another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is 
that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, 
accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always 
growing) state of nations (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all the 
nations of the earth. But, in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, 
204 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 354. 
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they do not at all want this, thus rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi; 
so (if all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a world republic only 
the negative surrogate of a league that averts war, endures, and always 
expands can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from 
right, though with constant danger of its breaking out. 206 
Here Kant argues that, in accordance with the Original Contract, the state of nations 
should be established. However, even though in theory this is a right step for 
perpetual peace, every state in considering its self interests properly will reject the 
construction of such a super state. In general, states do not want some parts of their 
sovereign right to be bound immediately, "and so it has always been ridiculed by 
great statesmen, and still more by heads of state, as an academic and childish idea 
emerging from the schools." 207 Kant thus advances the "negative" prohibitive 
organization, i.e., the league of nations, instead of the "positive" notion of the state 
of nations for the sake of compromising with all states on peace. While the league of 
nations can prevent war, the hostility among states cannot be thoroughly dissolved. 
The problem of hostility is no doubt a major issue in the development of 
international order, especially since the nineteenth century. The League of Nations 
established after World War I turned out to be the first international organization. 
However, subsequent history have shows that the League of Nations was 
incompetent in mediating many entanglements between states, e.g. Japan's invasion 
of Manchuria (1931), Italy's attack on Abyssinia (1939), the U. 5. 5. R. attack on 
Finland (1939), etc., not to mention its helplessness in the face of German aggression 
206 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 357. 
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of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Eventually Japan, Italy and German 
successively withdrew from the futile organization and World War 11 was to break 
out. 208 During World War 11, Winston Churchill and Franklin De la no Roosevelt 
attempted to build another powerful international organization for preventing war, 
and thus the United Nations was established. While it has rectified some weaknesses 
of the League of Nations, the United Nations remains inefficient in stopping wars or 
conciliating serious conflicts between states, e.g. the cold war, Israel's invasion Egypt 
in 1967, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf Wars, and of 
course the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Also, as mentioned in my discussion of Kant's first article, it seems that the 
United Nations cannot successfully reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
especially in non-republican states, such as North Korea and Iran, which still threaten 
to wage wars. The United Nations has imposed economic sanctions on such 
non-republican states but they simply will not yield to its pressure. Nevertheless, one 
should note that when one criticizes these loose international organizations as 
incompetent, one takes the supposed notion of the state of nations as the criteria to 
apply to these organizations. In other words, international order and the notion of 
state will unify gradually. The reformation of the United Nations will progressively 
approximate to the international coercive laws. Thus, federalism will transform 
progressively towards the state of nations, which is a better guarantee of perpetual 
peace. 
C. Third definitive article: "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of 
208 From 1931 there were several events which weakened the power of the League of Nation. See J 
See C. L. Mowat ed., The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12, op. cit., pp. 242-68. 
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universal hospitality (Dos Weltbiirgerecht soli auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen 
Hospitalitiit eingeschri:inkt sein)." 
Cosmopolitan right is the last but the most significant article in the theory of 
perpetual peace because it shows Kant's cosmopolitan perspective in pursuing the 
state of nations. lt is "a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and 
the right of nations necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings and 
so for perpetual peace." 209 To begin with, I shall make clear two key terms, i.e., 
"cosmopolitan right" and "hospitality." The former "has to do with the possible union 
of all nations with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce," 210 
and the latter means "the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility."211 
Accordingly, this article can be divided based on the two arguments, the problem of 
commerce and the problem of colony. 
First I shall deal with the problem of commerce. Kant asserts that all human 
beings have the right of possession in common of the earth's surface.212 All human 
beings thus can be regarded as members of the world. Also, due to the arrangement 
of nature, different groups and tribes live in their o~n part of the Earth where they 
possess different types of resources. In order to satisfy their desire of daily life, they 
have to approach each other and this gradually develops into barter commerce, and 
later into the general use of money as a medium of commercial exchange. For Kant, 
commercial activity will drive all states in seeking perpetual peace. He explains: 
209 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 360. 
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lt is the spirit of commerce, which cannot coexist with war and which sooner or 
later takes hold of every nation. In other words, since the power of money may 
well be the most reliable of all the powers (means) subordinate to that of a 
state, states find themselves compelled (admittedly not through incentives of 
morality) to promote honorable peace and, whenever war threatens to break 
out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by mediation, just as if they were in a 
permanent league for this purpose. 213 
Any war threatens to break commercial activities. War and commercial activity are 
plainly incompatible. The state has to choose either war or business. After calculating 
the consequences, all states prudently choose commerce rather than war. In other 
words, they are attracted by the power of money. In order to protect commerce, all 
states will endeavor to maintain the condition of peace. Obviously, the spirit of 
commerce belongs to regulative judgment, which, as discussed in chapter 2, 
organizes the objects as a system in the empirical level. In other words, human desire 
in the empirical level will be a drive which encourages commerce, the latter in turn 
conforming to the idea of perpetual peace. Accordingly, everyone as a member of 
the world has the right to go everywhere for commerce. 
Nevertheless, Kant is concerned about that the great possibility of abusing this 
right will infringe upon the right of the inhabitants of the land. 214 Hence, as the title 
of the article suggested, this right is limited by universal hospitality. In elucidating the 
notion of hospitality, Kant introduces a pair of rights: people only have the right to 
213 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 368. 
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visit (Besuchsrecht) rather than to be a guest ( Gastrecht). 215 As mentioned above, all 
human beings have "the right of possession in common of the earth's surface on 
which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being 
near one another."216 Hence, everyone has the right to visit the land of another 
unless he is hostile. While people have the right to visit, it does not follow that 
people have the right to be a guest. According to Kant's understanding, the notion of 
guest requires a special pact with one as "a member of the household for a certain 
time."217 The notion involves the right of settlement. 
As Kant has analyzed, people in individual states are separated by nature in 
different parts of the earth and naturally have their right of possession of their 
lands.218 In accordance with the view of right as "mine and yours", one cannot at will 
infringe upon other peoples' right of possession and has no right to settle on other 
peoples lands by force except for making contract with the inhabitants of such 
lands.219 Or, more explicitly, people have no right to invade a land belonging to other 
people and to exterminate habitants on the land. Kant critically comments on the 
justifications for establishing the colony, say, for missionary purposes. 220 
The more important reason behind them is that some civilized states merely 
develop their own economy through plundering resources from other lands. 
However, "all these supposedly good intentions," as Kant criticized, "cannot wash 
away the stain of injustice in the means used for them"221 because these means 
215 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 358. 
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plainly infringe upon the right of another state. Therefore, cosmopolitan right should 
be confined to the right to visit for the sake of avoiding unnecessary infringement of 
others' right. 
Towards the end of the article, Kant indicates that cosmopolitan right will be 
more significant in the future. 115ince the (narrower or wider) community of the 
nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the 
earth is felt in a//, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated 
way of representing right. 222 As discussed above, cosmopolitan right necessarily 
relates to the development of globalization. One of the significant problems in such a 
development is economic interest of nations. Kant seems to be somewhat optimistic 
in conceiving the ground of cosmopolitan right as he seems to have neglected the 
problem of global economic justice. Due to the power of money, many states 
advocating free trade have joined forces in establishing a free trading environment in 
recent years. In order to deal with the rules of trade in such an environment, these 
states have finally established an international organization, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) {1995- ), which enables some powerful and developed states to 
obtain unfair gains e.g. free customs duties. However, the interests of developing 
states who want to join WTO are undermined because they are forced to forfeit 
customs duties which can protect their home industries and agricultures. As the 
production costs in the developing state may be higher than in the developed 
nations, the home industries and agricultures in developing states will likely decline 
and the unemployment will increase. Such a phenomenon naturally harms the 
stability of the government and the state is prone to civil war. In sum, the power of 
money may be a doubt-edged sword that gives birth to peace, and to war. 
222 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 360. 
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Ill. Remark 
According to the notions of public right and of purposiveness, Kant puts forward 
some substantial articles for the international order towards the end of the 
eighteenth century. As Kant in his essay: "On the common saying: That may be 
correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice" argues, he attempts to controvert 
some arguments about the relation between theory and practice. In other words, 
Kant is concerned about whether the theory can be practical or not. In the following, 
I shall examine whether Kant's project practical or not through his criteria. 
While attempts have been made to implement the project of perpetual peace 
for almost two centuries, the enterprise is unfortunately still incomplete. For 
example, The United Nations, as a major achievement inspired by the project, exerts 
its role as conciliator only insufficiently in mediating the conflicts between states. In 
the meantime, the hostility congests states and war continuously threatens lives of 
the human race. We are still petrified by the photos of atrocities taken at war scenes. 
Also, human rights are not being fully protected. On the contrary, the issues of 
infringement upon human rights happen frequently. lt seems that we are still far 
away from the state of perpetual peace. 
If one were to consider whether or not the substantial articles of the project can 
respond to the current international situation, one could conclude that Kant's project 
indeed fails to come out. Although the United Nations was established in accordance 
with the second definite article, numerous problems have beset this international 
organization. First, it is a rather loose organization. In Kant's term, it is not a state to 
enact coercive laws, but merely a federation supported by ineffective laws. Thus, it is 
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difficult for the decisions made by the United Nations to be deemed as true laws 
since the United Nations cannot compel its members to implement the decisions. 
When some undemocratic or non-republican states threaten their neighbors by 
means of nuclear weapons, the United Nations can only reproach their action or at 
best impose economic sanctions against them. If, worse, these states disregard 
serious consequences and proceed to declare a war, the United Nations simply 
cannot effectively prevent the outbreak of the war because it lacks military power. 
On the contrary, various international military pacts, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), that has prevented war successfully. This ironic fact reveals the 
incompetence of the United Nations, and, perhaps more important, the deep 
problem of its representativeness. One may doubt, with justification, whether or not 
the United Nations can in effect embody and represent its members' will or defend 
their rights. lt may well be what the subtitle of Kant's treaties has suggested: "On the 
common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice." 
There is little doubt that Kant's six preliminary articles and three definitive 
articles are somewhat primitive because they ignore some important empirical 
factors. Unlimited economic interest, for instance, may threaten global economic 
justice and lead to state of war. Although Kant argues that in theory the power of 
money and spirit of commerce would drive all states into lawful conditions, hostilities 
among states can gradually increase, due to economic inequality, e.g., unfair trade. 
Moreover, in order to develop or maintain their own flourishing economy, many 
powerful and developed states may employ various unjust means to deprive the 
interests of developing countries. This again suggests that the power of money alone 
is not sufficient for peace. 
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Another neglected factor is the conflict between different religions or cultures. 
Kant seems to have underestimated the power of religion and culture, both of which 
can bring great unrest to the world. The September 11th attack serves an extreme 
example of drastic confliction between Islamic cultural value and that of the West. 
The conflict is more and more likely to perpetually threaten peace. As Samuel 
Huntington's well-known analysis suggests, different civilizations would clash 
because of conflict of cultural and religious identities. 223 Different groups of religious 
fundamentalists desire to build their "heavens" on Earth in accordance with their 
religious aspirations and values. Thus, they fanatically attempt to force other peoples 
and cultures into accepting their peculiar conception of value by different methods 
including international terror. With the development of globalization, there is little 
doubt that the frequency of collision between different cultures will rapidly increase. 
223 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1997). 
84 
Conclusion 
Despite that the notion of perpetual peace plays a significant role in human lives. 
Theoretical discussion on the topic has been scarce. With the publication of Toward 
Perpetual Peace- A Philosophical Project, Kant is the first philosopher who 
introduced a philosophical dimension into the problem. Also, according to his later 
publications of moral philosophy, this problem emerged as the final purpose of the 
metaphysics of moral. 
Kant's theory of perpetual peace contains two grounds. The first is the notions 
of public right. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant obviously argues that right is 
"mine and yours" (dos Mein und Dein). According to this view, right does not only 
belong to someone alone, but is universal for all human beings. The expression of 
"mine and yours" shows that Kant attempts to tackle the problem of right from 
inter-personal perspective, which refers to the level of inter-subjectivity. This notion 
also is the crucial point of the private right and the public right. One can say that the 
view of right as "mine and yours" is the key idea of Kant's theory of right. 
Kant thereafter defines the notion of universal right through moral law: "Right 
(Recht) is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the choice ( Willkiir) of 
one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of 
freedom." 224 This insight is totally different from the traditional the theory of right 
which attributes the ground to natural law in analogy to laws of nature. In other 
words, for Kant, moral law is the ground of right. Admittedly, from this definition, 
one comes to know that the problem of right involves the problem of freedom. Kant, 
224 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 230. 
85 
thus, should spell out how moral law would be the ground of freedom and of right. 
Kant has to deal with the dispute between moral law and laws of nature. The Third 
Antinomy, put forward in his first Critique, shows that transcendental freedom and 
laws of nature are compatible so long as one conceives them from two different 
perspectives, i.e., noumenal and phenomenal perspectives. In his later works of 
moral philosophy, he endeavors to transit the ground of freedom from laws of nature 
to moral law. He analogizes moral law with laws of nature in articulating that the 
former shares the universality of the latter. In modern political philosophy, some 
philosophers, such as Rawls, intend to remove or avoid metaphysical elements in 
constructing their theories so as to avoid some controversial disputes. Rawls's theory, 
however, assumes that each person is free and autonomy. These assumptions have 
already involved more or less metaphysical elements. Although moral law seems to 
be the metaphysical principle, as Kant suggests, it is merely to consider law from 
noumenal perspective. Therefore, moral law is the indispensable ground for moral 
and political philosophy, especially the possibility of free action of an agent. 
Although moral law is the ground of freedom, the sense of freedom in the 
public sphere is different from the private sphere. Hence, Kant introduces the Wille 
and Willkur distinction of will, which corresponds to different levels of freedom. The 
former refers to purification of the will in the level of subjectivity of individual and 
the latter refers to the problem whether people can choose different maxims for 
their action in the level of inter-subjectivity. Obviously, Willkur is what the notion of 
right attempts to protect. According to this understanding, Kant redefine the sense of 
f reedom in the level of subjectivity: "Freedom (independence from being 
constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every 
other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every 
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man by virtue of his humanity."225 
In order to elucidate the external relation between subjects, Kant advances the 
notion of Original Contract in which subjects mutually bind their freedom. In the 
essay "On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in 
practice/' Kant spends a lot of space to characterize the function of Original Contract. 
The function of Original Contract shows that one behaves socially and politically as if 
one has signed a contract in which he merely obeys to his own reason rather than to 
any authority, and by which one constrains himself voluntarily. For Kant, the notion 
of Original Contract, as a rational idea, is not only to elucidate the grounds of civil 
state, but also to appraise whether or not the public law and political system are just. 
According to the view of right as "mine and yours," the notion of Original Contract 
can also apply to international order in which the relation between states also 
involve the public right. 
Furthermore, in order to remove mistrust and to prevent injustice between 
states, Kant advances the notion of the form of publicity (Publizitat). This notion of 
publicity is an a priori condition which involves in every claim to right, "since without 
it there would be no justice (which can be thought only as publicly known) and so too 
no right, which is conferred only by justice."226 In accordance with this form, Kant 
casts new transcendental principles of public right: "all actions relating to the rights 
of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity" 227, and "all maxims 
which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) harmonize with right and 
225 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 237. 
226 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 381. 
227 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 381. 
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politics combined."228 These two principles can be deemed as another formulation 
of freedom in the level of inter-subjectivity and the notion of Original Contract. 
For Kant, although the notion of pubic right is the core element in the theory of 
perpetual peace, it seems that there is lack of guarantee since the progress of 
perpetual peace may regress. In the supplement of Toward Perpetual Peace- A 
Philosophical Project, Kant introduces another transcendental principle, i.e. the 
notion purposiveness as "lawfulness of the contingent as such,"229 to act as the 
guarantee of perpetual peace. He claims that war, as a mean of nature, will arrange 
different peoples to live in different parts of the world. Meanwhile because of the 
power of money, peoples will develop the commercial activity which requires a 
peace state. Kant thus believes that, by means of war, nature will push the human 
being toward perpetual peace. From this peculiarity seems that Kant is an adherent 
of war. He, however, construes war in terms of purposiveness. From this point of 
view, the human being can regard all objects not as disjointed things but as a system 
in which there are hierarchical orders in terms of species and genera and the 
systematic organization of empirical laws. Some scholars, who disagree with this 
argument, claim that this guarantee is redundant in tbe theory of perpetual peace. lt 
seems that they neglect the discussion of reflective judgment in the third Critique. 
Reflecting judgment is to find the universal from given particulars. Since one 
conceives the nature as the systematic interconnection of empirical laws in 
accordance with the notion of purposiveness. Kant further argues that the notion of 
purposiveness is technical. The notion "yields subjective principles that serve as a 
228 To ward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 386. 
229 
"First Introduction", 20: 217. 
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guideline for investigation of nature."230 lt is technical because one conceives nature 
as a system in light of the notion of "the technique of nature (Technik der Natur)," 231 
which is "only grounds a maxim for the power of judgment"232 and by which one 
analogizes nature with art as if nature is a profound designed. Comparing the notion 
of technique of nature with categories and freedom, the latter are both named 
"nomothetic" (Nomothetick), 233 whereas the former is named heautonomy 
(Heavtonomie). 234 In other words, the technique of nature is pertained to our 
reflective mode. 
According to the third Critique, the notion of purposiveness can be distinguished 
into internal and external purposiveness. The guarantee of perpetual peace involves 
the latter which means that "one thing in nature serves another as the means to an 
end."235 Kant argues that the human being is not only the ultimate end (letzter 
Zweck) of nature, but also the final end (Endzweck). Kant identifies the highest good 
with the final end, i.e. happiness in harmony with morality. In other words, through 
this final end, the human being can conceive all particulars as if they would help the 
human being in actualizing the final end. In the theory of perpetual peace, the 
regulating judgment can be deemed as a directive force for attaining perpetual peace 
for the human being. 
Based on these two transcendental principles, i.e. the principle of public right and 
the notion of purposiveness, Kant advances the project of perpetual peace. For a 
230 
"First Introduction", 20: 204. 
231 
"First Introduction", 20: 204. 
232 
"First Introduction", 20: 205. 
233 
"First Introduction", 20: 215 . 
234 
"First Introduction", 20: 225 . 
235 Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5: 425. 
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basic appreciation of this project, I have discussed the meaning of the notion of 
perpetual peace. As Kant analyzes, since this is an unachievable idea, the human 
being never attain the state of perpetual peace. This unachievable notion can be 
pertained as an idea of perfection. While the human being cannot attain the state, 
this function of the notion plays a role of "continual approximation (Annaherung)," 236 
which leads the human being in endeavoring into perpetual peace. This notion, thus, 
is the final purpose of the public right. 
The project of perpetual peace mainly contains two parts, i.e. six preliminary 
articles and three definitive articles. The former aim to remove the mistrust between 
states and to prohibit war and the latter elucidates the conditions which can 
maintain the state of perpetual peace lastingly. Obviously, the most controversial 
topic lies on the three definitive articles, i.e. 1. The civil constitution in every state 
shall be republican, 2. The right of nation shall be based on a federalism of free states, 
3. Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. In history, 
these articles nevertheless are very difficult to implement. Also, the pity is that Kant 
ignores other elements leading to war, i.e. different religions and cultures which are 
the main causes of conflicts in recent two centuries. 
If one merely evaluates Kant's theory of perpetual peace from the historical 
perspective, his theory may seem to be unsuccessful in solving the many problems 
today. However, if one adopts another angle, i.e. philosophical perspective, one will 
obtain another picture. Although Kant actually underestimates other factors which 
may also have caused wars, one of the focal point of his entire project is the grounds, 
i.e. the notions of public right and of purposiveness. 
236 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 350. 
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As I mentioned in chapter 3, it seems that Kant neglects the problem of culture. 
He only spends little space on discussing this topic. However, in the first supplement 
"On the guarantee of perpetual peace," he indicates that: 
[Nature] makes use of two means to prevent peoples from intermingling and to 
separate them: differences of language and of religion, which do bring with 
them the propensity to mutual hatred and pretexts for war but yet, with 
increasing culture and the gradual approach of human beings to greater 
agreement in principles, leads to understanding in a peace that is produced 
and secured, not as in such a despotism {in the graveyard of freedom), by 
means of a weakening of all forces, but by means of their equilibrium in 
liveliest competition. 237 
As mentioned in my discussion of the notion of purposiveness in chapter 2, nature 
would plan the separation of peoples not only by means of war, but also through 
language and religion. However, peoples ultimately have to compromise and tolerate 
each other because of cultural development. In other words, nature would induce 
people to search for common grounds in solving their problems. In the passage cited 
above, Kant obviously does not suggest eliminating different cultures for achieving 
perpetual peace. On the contrary, according to the plan of nature, the difference 
between cultures should be assumed as a necessary condition of the theory of 
perpetual peace. No peoples are required to abandon their own cultural 
characteristics in the process of perpetual peace. Rather, they are to seek common 
ground while preserving their differences. To communicate and to tolerate each 
237 Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, 8: 367. 
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other's differences through reason will bring hope to perpetual peace. 
lt is clear that people would definitely attack others at will by violent measures. 
Instead, it must be assumed that all peoples are mutually bound by a common 
fundamental principle, i.e., the transcendental principle of public right. If one intends 
to maintain multiple cultures, such cultures should comply with this formal principle 
or the common ground in which the protection of human right and freedom feature 
as universal value for all human communities. After all, in accordance with the notion 
of Original Contract, freedom as the innate right does not just pertain to man's 
individual possession, but is "mine and yours." 
From the philosophical perspective, Kant has contributed greatly to the grounds 
of the theory of perpetual peace, and shown the right direction of human being's 
purposive development. Although difficulties abound in the process of achieving 
perpetual peace, one should not be pessimistic. In my view, Kant's theory of 
perpetual peace could serve as a torch that guides us to proceed in the right way in 
the midst of darkness. To conclude this thesis, I shall therefore quote a paragraph 
from Toward Perpetual Peace- A Philosophical Proje_ct. 
If it is a duty to realize the condition of public right, even if only in 
approximation by unending progress, and if there is also a well-founded hope 
of this, then the perpetual peace that follows upon what have till now been 
falsely called peace treaties (strictly speaking, truces) is no empty idea but a 
task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal (since the times 
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